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This dissertation is comprised of three stand-alone essays in the field
of corporate finance. Chapter 1 provides an introduction and overview
of the three essays (Chapter 2-4). Chapter 2 explores the driving force
behind the observed declining pattern of investment-cash flow sensitivity,
which has puzzled empirical researchers for a decade. It investigates the
variation of capital adjustment costs in explaining the investment-cash
flow sensitivity and shows that the decreasing trend of the investment-
cash flow sensitivity can be explained by the gradually increasing costs
of capital adjustment. Chapter 3 studies the behavior of the firms in
the aftermath of the 2007-09 financial crisis. A negative shock to the
collateral value, which results in tightening the borrowing capacity, leads
to a protracted recession of the firms’ activities with the real business
conditions unaffected. However, the effect of the collateral shock subsides
when it coincides with a slowdown in the productivity. The reduction of
labor adjustment costs causes investment and employment growth to decline
more (less) aggressively with the negative productivity shock (collateral
shock) and the trimming of labor adjustment costs fares better for the
small firms. A flexible wage contract can significantly alleviate the negative
impact of the collateral shock. While the equity issuance falls (rises) with
the adverse productivity (collateral) shock, the cyclical behavior of equity
financing is less pronounced for the more financially constrained firms.
Chapter 4 is motivated by the endogeneity problem in standard regression
methodologies, which may overlook the coefficient biases induced by the
measurement error in the variables. The measurement error in Tobin’s
q, which operates via the covariance between q and cash flow, plays an
iii
iv
important part in explaining the time-series and cross-sectional pattern
of investment-cash flow sensitivity. Moreover, even a high-order moment-
based GMM estimator cannot address the bias if the measurement error is
not independent of q (a non-classical error). Chapter 5 summarizes the
main findings and concludes the thesis.
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Managers maximize firm value through choosing the optimal corporate investment,
employment and financial decisions. Investment behavior is affected by a number of
factors such as corporate productivity, adjustment technologies, fixed operating costs
as well as internal financial resources and the availability of external sources of finance
when the capital markets are imperfect. The interdependence between investment
decision and financial factors is often examined using investment-q regressions aug-
mented with cash flow. Chapter 2 attempts to explore the sensitivity of investment
decisions to internal funds and to examine the conclusions based on the time-series
pattern of the estimated investment-cash flow sensitivities. Furthermore, although
the interactions between the firm’s real activities and its financial constraints are
largely explored, their relationship has received little attention in an environment
where labor market frictions become an integral component. Chapter 3 investigates
the long-term effect of a financial crisis on corporate decisions in the context of capital
and labor dynamics. At the same time, the empirical inference of corporate investment
decision can be invalid due to the measurement error in the variables and, thus, biased
estimates of coefficients. Chapter 4 aims to investigate the measurement-error problem
in Tobin’s q and the way it leads to alternative explanations for the time-series and
cross-sectional patterns of cash flow sensitivity. Chapter 5 summarizes the main
findings and concludes the thesis.
Chapter 2 starts by referring to the observation that investment-cash flow sensitivity
had been decreasing over time to disappear almost completely by late 2000s. The
1
2study shows that this pattern is consistent with the observed evolution of the capital
adjustment costs in a neoclassical investment model with costly external financing.
In particular, it estimates the magnitude of the capital adjustment cost parameter
across different periods and shows that the decreasing pattern of the I-CF sensitivity
can be explained by the gradually increasing costs of capital adjustment. The pattern
of adjustment costs is supported by a broad set of tests ranging from a nonlinear
estimation of the first order condition, a GMM estimation of Euler equation to a
structural estimation of the parameters. Consistent with the prior literature, it finds
no significant evidence of financial frictions contributing to the observed time-series
pattern. The main results are further corroborated in a robustness analysis, which
exploits the cross-industry and cross-country variation of capital adjustment costs.
Chapter 3 studies the implications of a financial crisis, which is associated with a large
and prolonged deterioration to the collateral value and a depression to the economic
outcomes such as investment, employment and output. I calibrate a model to explore
the impact of the collateral shocks as well as the productivity shocks on the firm’s real
and financial variables. With the model-simulated data, I am able to disentangle the
effect of credit supply shocks from the credit demand shocks by modeling productivity
and collateral shocks as two independent random processes. I find that a negative
shock to the collateral value, by tightening the borrowing capacity, leads to a deep
decline and a subdued recovery of corporate activities with the real business conditions
(productivity-driven) unaffected. Nonetheless, the impact of the collateral shock is
mitigated by a slowdown in the productivity (a demand-side shock). I emphasize the
empirical challenge faced by researchers: supply-effect subsides when the demand-effect
presides during the financial crisis and any contraction of the firms’ activity during
the crisis period can hardly be ascribed to the shocks in the credit supply. Also, I
examine how the impact of shocks varies with the nature of financial frictions and
labor market frictions. The reduction of labor adjustment costs causes investment and
employment growth to drop more significantly with the negative productivity shock
but to decline less significantly with the negative collateral shock.
3Chapter 4 is motivated by the fact that empirical finance research treats Tobin’s q
and cash flow as the explanatory variables despite the endogeneity problem arising
from the measurement error in q. Nonetheless, the effect of measurement error, which
operates via the covariance between q and cash flow, plays an important part in
explaining the time-series and cross-sectional pattern of cash flow sensitivity. This
chapter shows that measurement error diminishes investment-cash flow sensitivity in
the recent periods because it biases cash flow sensitivity downward when q and cash
flow are negatively covaried. The covariance structures also offer explanations for
the perceived “wrong-way” differential cash flow sensitivity between constrained and
unconstrained firms classified under the widely used a priori measures. Moreover,
neither OLS estimators nor high-order moment-based GMM estimators can address
the bias if the measurement error is not independent of q (a non-classical error).
Chapter 2
Can capital adjustment costs explain the
decline in investment-cash flow
sensitivity?
2.1 Introduction
One of key research areas in corporate finance is the effect of capital market imperfec-
tions on corporate investment. According to the standard q-investment model (Mussa
1977), the optimality condition equates the marginal value of capital (measured by
the marginal q) with the marginal cost of investment. Marginal q is the sole factor
relevant to the investment level. Financial factors, such as cash flow, are – in the
absence of capital market frictions – irrelevant.
At the same time, a number of empirical studies that rely on a reduced-form regression
model, which has investment as dependent variable and q and cash flow as independent
variables, show that investment is sensitive to cash flow. Fazzari, Hubbard & Petersen
(1988) interpret this investment-cash flow sensitivity as the evidence of financial
constraints because financially constrained firms may link their investment to the
availability of internal funds (see also Hoshi, Kashyap & Scharfstein 1991, Gilchrist &
Himmelberg 1995, Lamont 1997). However, Fazzari et al.’s view that investment-cash
flow sensitivity measures financial constraints has been challenged by, among others,
Kaplan & Zingales (1997), Cleary (1999), Moyen (2004), Alti (2003), and Gomes
4
5(2001). In particular, Erickson & Whited (2000, 2002) point out that the observed
empirical investment-cash flow sensitivity can be spurious as Tobin’s average q is a
not a valid proxy for investment opportunities, due to the measurement error.1
The above contributions, however, base their conclusions on the cross-sectional com-
parison of the investment-cash flow (I-CF) sensitivity. Relatively few papers focus
on its time-series pattern. Allayannis & Mozumdar (2004) are the first to observe a
declining I-CF sensitivity from 1977-1986 to 1987-1996. Ağca & Mozumdar (2008) find
that I-CF sensitivity decreases with factors that reduce capital market imperfections
but without establishing a direct time-series link between I-CF sensitivity and these
factors. More recently, Chen & Chen (2012) conclude that financial constraints cannot
explain the declining pattern of I-CF sensitivity as there is no indication of financial
constraints becoming more relaxed over time. They also document that the declining
pattern of I-CF sensitivity still exists with measurement-error-corrected estimates.
Although Brown & Petersen (2009) and Moshirian et al. (2017) conjecture that the
declining I-CF sensitivity is due to the shift of importance from physical capital to
intangible assets, Chen & Chen (2012) show that it is also R&D-cash flow sensitivity
that disappears by late 2000s.2 The declining trend of I-CF sensitivity therefore
remains a puzzle.
In this chapter, we demonstrate that this time-series pattern is consistent with the
evolution of the capital adjustment costs in a neoclassical investment model with
costly external financing. We estimate the magnitude of the capital adjustment cost
parameter across different periods and show that the decreasing pattern of the I-CF
sensitivity can be explained by the gradually increasing costs of capital adjustment.
Consistent with the prior literature, we find no evidence of financial frictions being
able to significantly contribute to the observed time-series pattern. Most previous
1The (observable) Tobin’s average q is equal to the marginal q if and only if the production
function displays constant returns to scale in a competitive market and the adjustment cost function
is linearly homogeneous to investment and capital (Hayashi 1982).
2Brown & Petersen (2009) report that cash flow sensitivity of total investment (physical capital
expenditure and R&D expense) still decreases across periods.
6studies examine how the financial situation of a firm affects its investment policy by
adding cash flow to the regression and comparing the I-CF sensitivity across groups of
firms sorted according to the characteristics that are assumed to capture the degree
of financial constraints. In this chapter, rather than rely on a priori measures of
financial constraints based on endogenous firm-level variables, we directly incorporate
external financing costs into a dynamic investment model, which allows us to generate
predictions about the effects of both financing frictions and capital adjustment costs.
Subsequently, we estimate the magnitude of financing costs and adjustment costs over
time as well as their effect on the time-series trend of the I-CF sensitivity.
Our results are consistent with those by Chen & Chen (2012) in the sense that declining
I-CF sensitivity is not a symptom of decreasing financial constraints. (We measure
the degree of financial constraints by estimating the parameter that captures the
cost of accessing outside finance and find no evidence of the decreasing cost.) We
demonstrate that the magnitude of I-CF sensitivity is not only an increasing function
of financing constraints but also a decreasing function of capital adjustment costs.
The intuition behind the latter result is as follows. When the firms invest out of
internally-generated cash flow, it incurs capital adjustment costs, hence the presence of
such costs lowers cash flow sensitivity of investment.3 Given that investment depends
less on the availability of internal funds when capital adjustment is more costly, a
positive time trend in the adjustment costs would result in a declining I-CF sensitivity.
Obtained empirical results support the hypothesis that it is a gradual increase of the
adjustment cost parameter over time that significantly contributes to the observed
declining I-CF sensitivity pattern.
The increasing capital adjustment costs argument is also consistent with the declining
investment-q sensitivity as the frictions of adjusting capital temper the response of
investment to the changes in growth opportunities captured by Tobin’s q. It is further
supported by the evidence from the extant literature as well as our own estimation
3Examples of capital adjustment costs include installation costs, costs of disrupting the old
production process and fees of training staff to adapt to the new equipment. More specific examples
are provided in Section 2.3.
7results based on the first order condition and simulated method of moments beginning
with the firm’s dynamic optimization problem. The evidence of the rising trend of
adjustment costs remains robust to using alternative measures of Tobin’s q as well
as to the estimation performed on the basis of the Euler investment equation, which
circumvents the use of a proxy for q. The simulated method of moments (SMM), which
chooses the parameters that match the actual moments with simulated moments, also
yields consistent results.
We argue that, based on the economic literature and historical statistics, the increasing
capital adjustment costs can be ascribed to the development of technology, e.g., the
widespread use of computers and software, network and automated systems. According
to PwC (2016), “the use of 3D printing is disrupting US manufacturing” and “the most
commonly cited barriers to the adoption is the cost and lack of talent and current
expertise”. Factories are switching to electrical vehicles, which although brings “new
ways of structuring transportation, land use and domestic energy use”, requests the
installations of necessary infrastructure (Barkenbus 2009). The adoption of high-tech
equipment and machine tools requires specialist skills to install and operate them
and makes retraining during working hours become inevitable.4 In the chapter, we
show an upsurge in the acquisition of information technology and communications
equipment in production and an increasing participation rate in the training. The
robustness of the relationship between the magnitude of capital adjustment costs and
technological progress is subsequently demonstrated using an analysis that exploits
both cross-industry and cross-country variation of the capital adjustment costs.
This work contributes to the literature on corporate investment and financing decisions
in several ways. Most significantly, we demonstrate that I-CF sensitivity can capture
both financial frictions as well as capital adjustment costs. Investment is reliant
on cash flow when it is costly to access the external financing market but it is less
4According to Clegg (Feb 28th, 2018), the online education program funded by AT&T to retrain
the workforce “requires at least 10 hours’ homework a week and take 6 to 12 months to complete”
and SEAT’s (the Spanish car company) re-skilling program opens the possibility for employees to
retrain during working hours.
8sensitive to cash flow in the presence of a higher capital adjustment cost. Empirically,
we show that it is the increasing magnitude of frictions generated by capital adjustment
that contribute to the declining I-CF sensitivity pattern. We, therefore, highlight
the role of frictions generated by the real side of economic activities in explaining
the responsiveness of investment to internal funds as in contrast with the frictions
generated by the financial market.
To capture the evolution of the investment-cash flow sensitivities, this chapter features
uses of time-varying model parameters. In this way, it allows us to infer the time-series
trend of economic parameters (most importantly, capital adjustment cost parameter).
Cash flow is a source of internal funds before the firm taps the external financing
market. The idea to model cash flow into investment-q equation is closest to the work of
Lewellen & Lewellen (2016), which is, however, restricted to the quadratic adjustment
cost. We consider a more general form of the adjustment cost function and estimate the
economic parameters across each time period based on the q equation. Furthermore,
we attempt to address the problem of measurement error in q by applying alternative
measures of q, re-estimating the relevant parameters based on the investment Euler
equation which does not require using q, and with the SMM methodology. Taken
together, we present a robust evidence that the capital adjustment cost parameter
is increasing over time. The linkage of model parameters with I-CF sensitivity is
related to several studies for structural models (e.g., Riddick & Whited 2009, Gamba
& Triantis 2008). They attempt to investigate the effect of model parameters on the
cross-sectional financial and saving behavior. We, however, modify the comparison
framework from cross-section to time-series and examine how the time-series variation
of model parameters can explain the investment response of the firm over time.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 2.2 describes data
sources and variables and documents the decreasing pattern of I-CF sensitivity. Section
2.3 provides develops testable hypotheses for the decrease of I-CF sensitivity based
on the q model of investment. Section 2.4 presents the estimation results for the
structural economic parameters and discusses how these parameters can explain the
9declining pattern of I-CF sensitivity. Section 2.5 contains a robustness analysis and
Section 2.6 concludes.
2.2 Data set and baseline results
2.2.1 Data sources, variables and summary statistics
The data comes from all manufacturing firms (SIC between 2000 and 3999) in the
Compustat industry annual file, covering the period between 1977 and 2016. (Inside
parentheses, we provide the name of the relevant data item in the Compustat industry
annual file.) Investment, I, is measured as capital expenditure (capx ) for annual
data from 1977-2016. Capital, K, is defined as net property, plant and equipment
(ppent). Tobin’s average q, Q, is the market value of capital over net property, plant
and equipment. Market value of capital is constructed as market value of asset minus
the difference between the book value of assets (at) and the book value of capital
(ppent). Note that by subtracting the gap between total asset and physical capital,
we remove the value of intangible assets in computing the market value of physical
capital. This allows us to measure investment opportunities for the physical capital.
The market value of assets is the sum of market value of common stock (cshoprcc),
total liabilities (lt), and preferred stock (pstk) minus deferred taxes (txditc). Cash
flow is income before extraordinary items (ib) plus depreciation and amortization (dp).
We keep the manufacturing firms which have SIC code between 2000 and 3999 and
keep only firms incorporated in the U.S. Data variables, namely investment, Tobin’s q
and cash flow, are required to have nonmissing values for each observation. Following
Almeida et al. (2004), we remove firms that have sales or asset growth exceeding 100%
to eliminate the effect of business discontinuities. We drop the firms that have asset,
sales or capital less than 1 million USD (see Chen & Chen (2012) and Moshirian et al.
(2017)). Finally, following Hennessy & Whited (2007), we winsorize all regression
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variables at 2% at each tail to reduce the effect of outliers for each year.5
Table 2.1 provides summary statistics for the regression variables. We divide the
samples into five-year subsample periods. The results are provided for each of the
subsample period. The mean and median level of investment-to-capital ratio are
relatively stable over time. The mean level of cash flow-to-capital ratio has decreased
substantially in recent decades while the mean level of Tobin’s q has risen from 1.30 to
10.82 over the 40 years. The median level of cash flow-to-capital ratio remains relatively
steady while the median level of Tobin’s q has increased over time as well. Both 25th
percentile and 75th percentile of Tobin’s q are increasing over time too, which suggests
that the increase of Tobin’s q is not limited to the sample of value firms or growth
firms. There is considerable variance in Tobin’s q and cash flow-to-capital ratio in
the recent periods as indicated by their great dispersions between 25th percentile
and 75th percentile and large standard deviations. We also present serial correlation
coefficients of the regression variables. The serial correlation (see Section 2.3 for
details) of investment-to-capital ratio indicates the smoothness of investment behavior
and it rises from around 0.45 in 1980s to 0.57 in the recent periods. The q variable is
also highly autocorrelated, which can result in the use of lagged instrumental variable
to correct for the measurement error in q being somewhat problematic (Almeida et al.
2010, Erickson & Whited 2012).
2.2.2 Baseline regression results and time-series variation of
I-CF sensitivity
The baseline regression equation for investment is:
Iit
Kit
 β0   β1Qit   β2CFit
Kit
  ηi   ηt   εit
5To reduce measurement error in the construction of q, Gilchrist & Himmelberg (1995) keep the
observations that have Tobin’s q between 0 and 10. We mitigate the impact of measurement error in
q by winsorizing the regression variables at a higher level. Appendix F also provides the baseline
regression results and nonlinear estimation results of q equations with data with no winsorization as
a robustness check.
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Table 2.1: Summary statistics for regression variables
This table displays summary statistics for the main regressor variables. It reports mean,
standard deviation, percentiles and first-order serial correlation for investment to capital
ratio, cash flow to capital ratio and Tobin’s q for each five-year subsample period from 1977
to 2016. All firm-level data are collected from Compustat over 1977-2016 period. The sample
contains all manufacturing firms (SIC code between 2000 and 3999) in U.S.. I{K is the
firm’s capital expenditure, scaled by beginning-of-period net property, plant and equipment.
CF {K is firm’s internal cash flow (income before extraordinary items plus depreciation),
deflated by beginning-of-period net property, plant and equipment. Q is Tobin’s average
q in the beginning of period, which is market value of capital over book value of capital
(measured by net property, plant and equipment).
Mean Std. Dev. Percentiles Serial
25th 50th 75th Corr.
Sample period:1977-1981
I{K 0.284 0.202 0.150 0.233 0.350 0.473
Q 1.296 1.788 0.321 0.812 1.679 0.830
CF {K 0.415 0.324 0.234 0.376 0.559 0.770
Sample period:1982-1986
I{K 0.257 0.212 0.119 0.198 0.320 0.410
Q 2.426 3.141 0.704 1.370 2.893 0.762
CF {K 0.302 0.435 0.134 0.294 0.495 0.680
Sample period:1987-1991
I{K 0.235 0.180 0.114 0.190 0.298 0.464
Q 2.929 3.844 0.889 1.672 3.351 0.798
CF {K 0.270 0.587 0.108 0.280 0.490 0.624
Sample period:1992-1996
I{K 0.266 0.225 0.119 0.198 0.331 0.541
Q 4.860 7.032 1.142 2.320 5.286 0.781
CF {K 0.329 0.858 0.136 0.326 0.600 0.639
Sample period:1997-2001
I{K 0.258 0.221 0.111 0.192 0.327 0.482
Q 6.204 10.435 1.139 2.571 6.409 0.686
CF {K 0.086 1.301 0.009 0.286 0.585 0.631
Sample period:2002-2006
I{K 0.220 0.207 0.090 0.156 0.274 0.524
Q 8.730 15.224 1.328 3.339 8.783 0.713
CF {K 0.049 1.769 -0.012 0.306 0.686 0.688
Sample period:2007-2011
I{K 0.231 0.209 0.097 0.170 0.289 0.508
Q 8.867 15.466 1.329 3.479 9.140 0.760
CF {K 0.031 2.113 -0.055 0.343 0.799 0.660
Sample period:2012-2016
I{K 0.236 0.192 0.114 0.184 0.287 0.570
Q 10.816 20.212 1.552 3.963 10.430 0.829




is firm’s physical investment scaled by beginning-of-period capital, CFit
Kit
is
firm’s cash flow deflated by beginning-of-period capital, Qit is the beginning-of-period
Tobin’s q, which is a proxy for investment opportunities, ηi denotes the firm-specific
fixed effect and ηt is the year fixed effect. βi, i P t0, 1, 2u denotes the relevant regression
coefficient.
Table 2.2 presents regression results from 1977-1981 to 2012-2016. Investment-cash
flow sensitivity, as defined in the empirical literature, is cash flow coefficient (β2).
In period 1977-1981 it equals 0.283 and is statistically significant. Afterwards, I-CF
sensitivity decreases. In 2002-2006, I-CF sensitivity becomes statistically insignificant
and remains so in period 2007-2011. It becomes statistically – but not economically –
significant again in 2012-2016.
Ağca & Mozumdar (2008) argue that the declining trend of I-CF sensitivity can be
explained by the decreasing financial constraints as indicated by the rising fund flows,
the increasing number of analyst following, the number of firms with bond rating and
the increasing proportion of large institutional ownership. Nonetheless, Chen & Chen
(2012) show that I-CF sensitivity still decreases even for financially unconstrained firms
and there is no sign of loosening financial constraints as the volume of new external
financing remains relatively stable.
2.3 Capital adjustment costs and I-CF sensitivity
The extant literature on investment-cash flow sensitivity has largely focused on the
effects of financial constraints (e.g., Ağca & Mozumdar 2008, Chen & Chen 2012). Yet,
relatively little effort has been made to investigate the impact of capital adjustment
costs on the responsiveness of investment to additional cash flow. For instance, the
presence of convex adjustment costs results in only a partial adjustment of capital
towards its desired level and leads to a positive serial correlation of investment (see,
e.g., Cooper et al. 1999, Caballero & Engel 2003). Although Cooper & Haltiwanger
13
Table 2.2: Baseline linear regression result
This table reports estimation results from baseline linear regression model
Iit
Kit1
 β0   β1Qit1   β2
CFit
Kit1
  ηi   ηt   εit,
in each five-year subsample period. ηi captures firm-specific fixed effect and ηt captures
year fixed effect, IitKit1 is the firm’s capital expenditure, scaled by beginning-of-period net
property, plant and equipment, CFitKit1 is firm’s internal cash flow (income before extraordinary
items plus depreciation), deflated by beginning-of-period net property, plant and equipment,
Qit1 is firm’s Tobin’q in the previous year, which is market value of capital over book value
of capital (measured by net property, plant and equipment. β1 denotes coefficient on q and
β2 denotes cash flow coefficient. Standard errors are clustered at firm level and reported in
the parenthesis. Adjusted R square R2a and number of observations are also reported. The
sample contains all manufacturing firms collected from Compustat over 1977-2016 period.
, , indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. Difference (and corresponding
q value) is computed as the difference in coefficients between 1977-1981 and 2012-2016.
Period β0 β1 β2 R2a Obs
1977-1981 0.125 0.023 0.283 0.488 8005
(0.009) (0.003) (0.019)
1982-1986 0.134 0.023 0.135 0.437 8057
(0.008) (0.003) (0.014)
1987-1991 0.137 0.016 0.065 0.44 7768
(0.006) (0.002) (0.008)
1992-1996 0.188 0.012 0.053 0.542 8412
(0.007) (0.001) (0.007)
1997-2001 0.151 0.008 0.027 0.478 8736
(0.006) (0.001) (0.005)
2002-2006 0.2 0.006 0.006 0.526 7556
(0.007) (0.001) (0.004)
2007-2011 0.169 0.007 -0.0001 0.498 6487
(0.007) (0.001) (0.004)
2012-2016 0.207 0.005 0.005 0.553 5151
(0.004) (0.000) (0.002)
Difference -0.082 0.018 0.278
p-value 0.203 0.000 0.000
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(2006) reports that the serial correlation of investment is low (estimated at 0.058)
at the plant-level, we show that the serial correlation is non-trivial at the firm-level
(see Table 2.1). To further support the presence of the convex adjustment costs (as
compared with the fixed costs), we allow the function of capital adjustment costs to
take a more general form and test for its convexity in Section 2.4.
A capital adjustment cost is the expenditure incurred before the equipment or plant
can be put to full use and it comprises installing costs (e.g., loss in production during
installation), fees of training labor to accommodate the new capital, lost expertise due
to the adoption of new technology, overtime costs, costs of disrupting the old system and
reorganising the production process. Goolsbee & Gross (1997) report that adjustment
costs for airline industry are mainly related to set-up costs in order to match the new
fleet and fees of training personnel to fly and maintain the fleet. Kiley (2001) assert
that adjustment costs of high-tech equipment, such as the costs of training workers to
use the technologies and reorganizing activities associated with the installation of new
capital, are important. Here are examples of capital adjustment costs extracted from
the company reports. Nestlé Group (2016, p16) has expensed the costs of disruption as
“impairment of property, plant or equipment”, which are mainly concerned about “the
plans to optimise industrial manufacturing capacities by closing or selling inefficient
production facilities” and the expenses amount to 201 million of CHF. Equipment
and facilities used for manufacturing are undergoing a costly technological change.
According to Intel Corporation (2016, p36), their R&D spending has increased by 5%
in 2016 from 2015 and a significant part of the rise comes from the high development
costs for the new process technology and manufacturers of semiconductors are now
facing “the increased costs of constructing new fabrication facilities to support smaller
transistor geometries”. From the perspective of sustainability, costs may incur to meet
the high environmental standards when building existing plants or constructing new
sites.
If firms had an unrestricted access to external finance market, they could invest
whenever valuable projects arise and internal funds would be irrelevant. With a
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limited access to the external capital market, the sensitivity of investment on cash flow
is positive and does not only depend on the costs of obtaining outside financing, but also
on the costs of adjusting the capital level. Financially constrained firms will boost their
investment to a smaller extent upon receiving cash windfall when capital adjustment
is costly. In this section, we formulate specific predictions on how external financing
costs and adjustment costs affect I-CF sensitivity and provide evidence supporting the
link between the trend of I-CF sensitivity and the intertemporal evolution of capital
adjustment costs.
Assume that time is discrete, It is investment at time t, Kt is capital stock that satisfies
the standard intertemporal condition
Kt 1  It   p1  δqKt,
with δ ¥ 0 denoting the depreciation rate. The adjustment cost, GpI,Kq, depends on
both investment and installed capital. The unit price of output and price of capital







where γ ¡ 0 and ψ reflects the elasticity of adjustment cost to investment rate. ψ
equals 2 in a model with a quadratic adjustment cost. The assumption of a quadratic
adjustment cost is essential in delivering the linear baseline regression. By allowing
the adjustment cost function to take a more general form, we can provide a test
for the functional form of capital adjustment cost function, specifically the test of
ψ  2.6 ΠpA,Kq  AKα denotes profit function and A is the stochastic profitability
shock that determines the exogenous state of the firm and α is the curvature on the
profit function (in Appendix 2.A, we derive the form of the profit function). As in
Gomes (2001) and Cooper & Ejarque (2003), we consider cash flow as a means to
6We empirically verify whether this assumption is plausible in Section 2.4. If the adjustment cost
function is quadratic, an additional $1 of investment will lead to a $γ IK increase in capital adjustment
costs.
16
supply firms with internal funds to finance investment. (We also present a model in a
prefect capital market in Appendix B, where we show that cash flow is added to the
empirical regression in an ad hoc way in the frictionless model.) The way to model
financial constraints is generally complex and we do not attempt to to endogenize
financial policy along the lines of Li, Whited & Wu (2016). As we are only interested
in comparing the magnitude of the financial frictions over time, we simply impose
a form for external financing cost as Gomes (2001) and Cooper & Ejarque (2003)
do. HpX,Kq is external financing cost function where X is the amount of external
financing funds one needs to raise to meet its investment demand (cash flow shortfall).
We assume equity is the sole source of financing and is only issued when the firm
is not able to fund the investment with its internal cash flow. Hennessy & Whited
(2007) argue that cost of external equity decreases with size of firm, hence external
financing cost is a function of capital K, whereas Krasker (1986) finds that shadow
cost of equity increases with the number of shares issued, hence external cost function
is assumed to convex and quadratic. We assume that the form for external financing






As in Cooper & Ejarque (2003), the amount of external financing funds X is defined
as the gap between investment and cash flow. We can include capital adjustment costs
in calculating X but we do not do in order to simplify the equations and also including
them does not substantially affect the main results. Cash flow is the profit generated
by the capital in place, and hence X  IΠ. Φ is an indicator which is equal to one if
I ¥ Π and zero otherwise. Parameter b reflects the cost of external financing. Fazzari
et al. (1988) characterize financial constraints as the wedge between the cost of internal
capital and the cost of accessing external capital. The higher the cost embedded in
raising funds from outside capital market (such as information asymmetric costs in
Myers & Majluf 1984), the higher the degree of financial constraints.
Equity holders choose an investment policy to maximize the firm value taking into
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account the cost of external financing
V pAt, Ktq  max
It
rpΠpAt, Ktq  ItGpIt, Ktq HpXt, Ktqq   θEAt 1|AtV pAt 1, Kt 1qs,
where θ denotes the discount factor. The marginal Tobin’s q (denoted subsequently by
qt) is defined as θEAt 1|AtVKpAt 1, Kt 1q, where VspA,Kq denotes the partial derivative
of firm value V with respect to s P tA,Ku. The first order condition with respect to I,






















γpψ  1qp I
K
qψ2   bΦ . (2.3.2)
See Appendix 2.C for details of the derivation. Provided that γ ¡ 0, lower b is
associated with a more muted response of investment relative to cash flow. As it is
possible that the decreasing I-CF sensitivity is the result of declining financing cost
parameter, we formulate the following empirical prediction:
H1: Cash flow sensitivity of investment decreases as a result of lower costs of external
financing.
From (2.3.2), we obtain that γ is negatively related to the partial derivative of
investment with respect to cash flow. In Appendix E, we also derive the equations for
the firm values considering a fixed capital adjustment cost based on Whited (2006).
It provides a framework in which the a fixed capital adjustment cost can lead to a
similar negative relationship between capital adjustment cost and I-CF sensitivity.
This result can be explained as follows. If the firm is financially constrained, its
investment depends on the availability of internal funds. But this dependence becomes
weaker with a higher adjustment cost as the firm is not willing to increase capital
upon receiving one unit of cash flow when making such capital adjustment is costly.
Therefore, an alternative explanation for the decreasing I-CF sensitivity over time
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could be the gradually increasing adjustment costs. Hence, we formulate the second
empirical prediction:
H2: Cash flow sensitivity of investment decreases due to higher capital adjustment
costs.
The above discussion implies that the changes in I-CF sensitivity may be a joined
result of the evolution of both financing constraints as well as capital adjustments
costs. What is worth pointing out is that the imperfections on the real side of firm’s
activities (adjustment costs) have an opposite effect on this sensitivity compared to
imperfections from financial markets (financing constraints).




γpψ  1qp I
K
qψ2   bΦ . (2.3.3)
One can see from (2.3.3) that partial derivative of investment to q is inversely related
to both capital adjustment costs and financial frictions. The investment demand will
vary less with the growth opportunities reflected in q if the firm’s investment behavior
is constrained by frictions from either financial market or from real economic activities.
With that in mind, we offer a preliminary test of our predictions by looking at the time
trend of investment-q (I-q) sensitivity. If I-CF sensitivity declines alongside with the
decrease of financial constraints, we should observe an increasing trend for q sensitivity.
On the other hand, if I-CF sensitivity declines as a result of higher capital adjustment
costs in late years, we should observe a decreasing trend for I-q sensitivity as well.
The baseline OLS regression results in Table 2.2 indicate both a declining q sensitivity
of investment as well as a downward-sloping I-CF sensitivity. This combination of
results supports the second prediction that decreasing I-CF sensitivity is driven by
the rising capital adjustment costs. Nonetheless, the OLS estimators are potentially
biased when the independent variables (right-hand-side variables) such as q variable
are measured with an error (e.g., Erickson & Whited 2000, 2012, Almeida et al.
2010). Therefore, in Sections 2.4 and 2.5 we provide a set of more refined tests of our
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predictions to assess the evolution of capital adjustment cost and financial frictions.
2.4 Empirical evidence
2.4.1 Empirical implementation of q equation
A. Estimation results with Tobin’s q
In the baseline regression equation, cash flow is added to the investment-q equation
in an ad hoc way and, therefore, little is said about the relationship between this
economic parameter and I-CF sensitivity. Even though Abel & Eberly (2011) provide
theoretical micro-foundations for the existence of I-CF sensitivity, they do so under
strong assumptions of no capital adjustment costs and a sufficient time-series variation
in the drift rate of productivity. Lewellen & Lewellen (2016) attempt to relate
economic parameters with I-CF sensitivity, but their approach is subject to a number
of potential shortcomings. First, they infer parameters based on the baseline linear
regression, which brings the cash flow to right hand side on purpose, rather than
bear the estimation on the optimality condition that equates the marginal value of
capital with its marginal cost (q equation). The baseline regression regards q variable,
which is always measured with error, as the explanatory variable. Based on the
classical measurement error theory, this will lead to inconsistency however independent
the measurement error is. One could also find that implying economic parameters
from the baseline regression coefficients will result in implausibly large estimates for
the adjustment cost and financing cost parameters. Second, they adopt an ex ante
assumption of a quadratic adjustment cost. We relax the assumption of the quadratic
adjustment cost and provide estimates of model parameters based on the q equation,
which comes directly from the first order condition. In such a context, we let q variable
become the dependent variable such that the measurement error in q will not infect the
parameter estimates as long as the measurement error is independent of investment
and cash flow.
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We start by estimating the model parameters based on the q equation.7 The corre-
sponding estimation equation of (2.3.1) is














  ηt   ηj   εit, (2.4.1)
ηt captures year fixed effect and ηj is dummy variable for each two-digit SIC industry
level. 8 Other variables are as those described in Section 2.2.1. Estimated parameters
are b, ψ and γ and they should all be positive. We select the set of parameters that
produce the least sum of squared error
°
ε2it (nonlinear least squares estimation). We
present the estimation results in Panel A of Table 2.3.
As discussed above, we choose mismeasured q variable as the dependent variable,
which will not lead to inconsistencies as long as the measurement error is independent
of the explanatory variables.9 Therefore, the estimates of the parameters based on
the q equation that has q as the regressand fare better than the ones implied from
the reciprocal of β1 and the ratio of β2 and β1. The adjusted R2 shown in Column 5
of Panel A Table 2.3 reveals that the model goodness-of-fit improves over time. It’s
7Even though it is may be more accurate to infer relevant parameters by matching the moments
from a dynamic structural model that endogenizes a firm’s investment policy to the moments observed
in the sample, it is helpful first to understand the intuition about how model parameters affect I-CF
sensitivity by looking at the partial derivative of investment with regard to cash flow derived from
the q equation. (In a more complex model of firm dynamics, such as Hennessy & Whited (2007),
it is generally not possible to obtain a closed-form expression for the I-CF relationship.) Later, we
provide the parameters estimates based on the structural methods of moments in Section 2.4.3
8We use industry dummies instead of firm dummies out of the concern for the limited memory of
the computer. Moreover, it is reasonable to aggregate short panel data in a higher level as regression
may fail to capture the characteristics of firms who have single observation during the five-year
subsample period if one uses firm-specific fixed effect. (See discussions in Lewellen & Lewellen (2016)
about the reluctance to add firm fixed effect. ) We find that between 10%-17% of the firms have
single observation and around 30% of the firms have only two-year observations in the subsample
period.
9In Erickson & Whited (2000), measurement error is assumed to be independent of IK and
CF
K .
Error that causes the deviation between marginal q and average q such as market power and interest
rate might be considered as exogenous. Even if the measurement error in not independent, the biases
induced by the measurement error in the explained variable can be translated into omitted variable
biases. The factor variables that cause empirical average q to deviate from marginal q is regarded as
omitted variables. Therefore, one can deal with the measurement error by incorporating into the
estimation equation the factor variables that could possibly cause such difference between empirical
average q and marginal q. We find that the parameter estimates including factor variables do not
change too much.
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worth noting that the right-hand side in the q equation implies the true marginal
q based on the first order condition. Therefore, the R2 of the q equation, based on
the definition in Erickson & Whited (2000), can roughly recover the proxy quality of
empirical q. The R2 is increasing over time, which is consistent with the finding in
Chen & Chen (2012) that the measurement quality in Tobin’s q is improving.
The estimates of ψ are reported in Column 3 of Panel A Table 2.3 and they are all
significantly different from (larger than) zero, which justifies the convex form (as
compared to the fixed form) of capital adjustment costs function. Column 6 in Panel
A of Table 2.3 presents the t statistics under the null hypothesis that ψ  2. Most of
the estimates of ψ are not significantly different from 2 at the 1% significance level,
which yields support for the commonly used quadratic cost assumption. Hence, for
simplicity, we from now on assume a quadratic function for capital adjustment costs.
The parameter b, which measures the cost of external financing, reflects the degree
of financial constraints and its estimates are reported in Column 4 of Panel A, Table
2.3. It is significantly positive in most of the periods even though it is zero in 1977-
1981.10 The estimated b is much higher in late 2000s than in the earlier days. If one
interpreters I-CF sensitivity as a measure of financial constraints, one would expect a
declining b over time. The degree of financial constraints, as implied by b, is increasing
across periods. This is consistent with Chen and Chen’s (2012) evidence that financial
constraints are not loosening over time. Also, studies such as Almeida, Campello &
Weisbach (2004) and Faulkender & Wang (2006) argue that constrained firms are more
inclined to hold cash and Bates, Kahle & Stulz (2009) show that there is an increase
in cash holding of U.S. firms. Therefore, we reject the first prediction and conclude
that financial constraints cannot explain the decreasing trend of I-CF sensitivity.
The estimates of adjustment cost parameter γ, which are reported in Column 2 of
Panel A Table 2.3, fluctuate around 5 in early years and increase to around 15 in
10This is not surprising as we do not include cash savings into the funding gap, thereby b measures
the combined costs of using external equity funds and spending out of cash, which is assumed to be
costless.
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1990s and 25 in 2000s. The rising trend of adjustment cost parameter might explain
the phenomenon that I-CF sensitivity declines over time. Investment responds less
strongly to cash flow in late periods because making capital adjustment is more costly.
With respect to the magnitude of γ, a few studies, which tend to infer the adjustment
cost parameter from the reciprocal of the q coefficient, yield implausibly high estimates
for γ. For example, Gilchrist & Himmelberg (1995) obtain a γ as high as 20 during
1985-1989. Hayashi (1982), using data from 1952-1978, also obtains a γ as large as 20.
The adjustment cost parameter estimated in this setting is much tighter and plausible,
i.e., γ is shown to be around 5 in 1977-1991, which is almost four times lower. As
stock-market-based Tobin’s average q is considered as less reliable in measuring the
investment opportunities (e.g., Cummins, Hassett & Oliner 2006, among others), we
intend to supply further empirical evidence of the increasing magnitude of capital
adjustment costs in the following sections.
B. Estimation results with alternative measures of q
Average q (market-to-book capital ratio) is not a good proxy for marginal q if any of the
linear homogeneity assumptions in Hayashi (1982) collapses. To address the concern
that the estimated rising trend of adjustment costs is driven by the imperfect proxy
for marginal q, we rerun the estimation with alternative measures of q. Gala (2014)
proposed a state-space measure of marginal q using capital stock and profitability shock.
He provides the estimates for the curvature on the profit function, which is α  0.51,
and hence profitability shocks can be implied from net profit as A  Π{Kα. Average q
(market-to-book capital ratio) is denoted as Q. After we run the regression of logpQq 
a0 a1logpAq a2logpKq a3logpAq2 a4logpKq2 a5logpAqlogpKq ε in each subsample
period, we can obtain the fitted value for {logpQq or Qˆ and coefficient sets for capital








and hence one can compute marginal q by q  pQp1   pa2   2 pa4logpKq   pa5logpAqq.
In standard investment theory, marginal q is based on managers’ evaluation of firm’s
fundamentals and any deviations of market valuations from managers’ assessed funda-
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mentals will be regarded as “misvaluation”(Blanchard, Rhee & Summers 1993). To
alleviate the concern that the parameter estimates are confounded by the misvaluation
component, we follow Goyal & Yamada (2004) and Campello & Graham (2013) and
construct fundamental q as the component in the market-to-book ratio that can be
explained by observable fundamental variables, which are the lagged value of cash
flow-to-capital ratio, sales growth, current asset-to-capital ratio, debt-to-capital ratio,
capital spending, capital expenditure, size (market capitalization), industry sales
growth, industry capital investment growth and industry R&D growth. Finally we
repeat the nonlinear estimation with Gala’s marginal q and fundamental q and then
present the results in Panel B of Table 2.3.
The results with Gala’s q (reported in the left panel of Panel B Table 2.3) reveal that
the estimates of the adjustment cost parameter γ rise across periods from 0.029 in
1977-1981 to 4.782 in 2012-2016. The results with fundamental q (reported in the
right panel of Panel B Table 2.3) also show that the adjustment cost parameter γ
increases steadily over time. We assume a quadratic form of adjustment cost function
in both cases given that ψ shown in Panel A does not significantly differ from 2 in
economic magnitude. Both measures demonstrate that the financing cost parameter is
increasing through time. We conclude that the increasing trend of adjustment cost
parameter is robust even if we replace the market-to-book ratio with the alternative





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































2.4.2 Empirical implementation of Euler equation
The investment Euler equation provides an additional approach to estimating economic
parameters of interest. The Euler equation, which equates the marginal cost of
investment today with the expected discounted cost of waiting to invest tomorrow,
has the advantage of avoiding the use of the q variable. Assuming a risk-free discount
rate (denoted by r), the value of firm is






1   r q
τtpΠpAτ , Kτ q  Iτ GpIτ , Kτ q HpXτ , Kτ qq,
subject to Kt 1  It   p1  δqKt.
We assume a quadratic form for the adjustment cost function and linear homogeneity
for profit function as in Gomes, Yaron & Zhang (2006). Differentiating with respect
to Kt 1 and adding an expectation error t 1 where Etpt 1q  0 to remove the
expectation operator, we arrive at the estimation equation for the Euler equation
(Details for derivation can been seen in Appendix 2.D):
1
1   r























































We follow Whited (1998) and employ two-step GMM to estimate the parameters in
(2.4.2). Any information set at time t is orthogonal to the expectation error at time
t  1. Therefore, we use GMM to estimate the parameters with the moment condition
of EpZtt 1q  0 where Zt denotes a set of instruments. The instrument set consists
of time dummy variables, lagged value of investment-capital ratio, cash flow-capital
ratio, debt-capital ratio, current asset-capital ratio, capital spending, sales growth
and cash reserve. The estimation results are provide in Table 2.4. The J statistic
and its corresponding p value provide an overview on the model’s ability to fit the
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data. The J test shows that the overidentifying restrictions are rejected in most of
the periods, which is not surprising due to the large cross-sectional variations in the
dataset (see the discussion in Gomes et al. (2006)). The J statistic decreases over
time, which shows that there is an improvement in the model’s goodness-of-fit. The
adjustment cost parameter estimates oscillate around zero in the early periods and go
up to around 9 in 2010s. The estimation results based on the Euler equation reinforce
the argument that the adjustment costs exhibit an increasing trend, which can justify
the decreasing pattern of I-CF sensitivity.
Table 2.4: Estimation of investment Euler equation
The following table presents the two-step GMM estimation results of (2.6). The instrument
sets consist of time dummy variables, lagged value of investment-capital ratio, cash flow-
capital ratio, debt-capital ratio, current asset-capital ratio, capital spending, sales growth
and cash reserve. The weighting matrix in the first step is identity matrix and the weighting
matrix for the second step is the inverse of robust standard errors clustered at firm level.
Standard errors clustered at firm level for the estimated coefficients are reported in the
parenthesis. The J statistics and the corresponding p value (reported in parenthesis) are
recorded in the last column.
Period γ b J Stats
1977-1981 0.512 0.000 428.831
(0.078) (0.208) (0.000)
1982-1986 -0.190 0.000 379.892
(0.055) (0.098) (0.000)
1987-1991 1.453 0.000 23.602
(0.128) (0.089) (0.008)
1992-1996 -0.228 0.685 86.296
(0.168) (0.114) (0.000)
1997-2001 1.507 0.192 28.849
(0.181) (0.063) (0.001)
2002-2006 1.412 0.465 52.473
(0.439) (0.082) (0.000)
2007-2011 6.856 0.327 21.133
(0.660) (0.060) (0.020)
2012-2016 8.995 0.717 12.381
(1.728) (0.130) (0.260)
27
2.4.3 Evidence based on structural estimation of parameters
2.4.3.1 Constant adjustment cost parameter
In this section, we estimate relevant parameters with simulated method of moments
(SMM). SMM does not require a proxy for q and avoids the arbitrary choice of
instruments in the estimation of the Euler equation. More specifically, we attempt
to simulate data based on the investment-q model. The functional form of the profit,
adjustment costs and financing costs are as described in Section 2.3. Subsequently, we
choose the parameters that closely track the relevant properties of the actual data,
which are the coefficients of the baseline regression. The key parameter of interest is
capital adjustment cost parameter (γ) and we also take into account the curvature
of the profit function (α), which is informative about the returns to scale in the
production function and the average productivity. Also as pointed out by Cooper &
Ejarque (2003), due to the concavity in the profit function, Tobin’s average q is not a
sufficient statistic and this concavity will affect the measurement error in Tobin’s q
and, thereby, the responsiveness of investment to the information content contained in
cash flow. We first assume that managers are myopic and γ is perceived as constant.
In each five-year subsample period, we estimate the relevant model parameters, namely
γ and α, by matching the actual moments with the moments generated from the
simulated data. The moments we aim to match are q sensitivity of investment, β1,
and cash flow sensitivity of investment, β2.
The vector pA,Kq defines the state of the firm and the equity holders choose the
optimal investment to maximize the firm value. The source of uncertainty comes
from the productivity shock of the firm A. Numerical solutions for the firm value and
investment decision is based on an iterative algorithm (value iteration). To simplify
notation, denote xt as x and xt 1 as x
1 . The logarithm of this shock variable, defined
as a  logpAq, is assumed to follow a first-order autoregressive process with zero drift:
a
1  ρaa  1 ,
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where ρa is an autoregressive coefficient and 
1  Np0, σaq, identically independently
distributed across time. We transform the first-order autoregressive process into
a discrete-state Markov chain following Tauchen (1986) where the value sets and
corresponding transition probability are determined by rρa σas. We let a take Na  10
points from the discretized set of r3σa{
ap1  ρ2aq 3σa{ap1  ρ2aqs and define the
interval between each point as w  6σa{p
ap1  ρ2aqpNa1qq. We denote the probability
that log stochastic shock a1 becomes a¯i given that log stochastic variable in the last
period a is a¯j as ppj, iq  Prra1  a¯i|a  a¯js. Then probability matrix for j  1 . . . Na
and i  1 . . . Na is,
ppj, iq  Prra¯i  w{2 ¤ ρaa¯j   1 ¤ a¯i   w{2s
 Np a¯i  ρaa¯j   w{2
σa
q Np a¯i  ρaa¯j  w{2
σa
q.
The discretized set for capital stock K is defined as:
K¯, K¯p1  δq, . . . , K¯p1  δq49,
where the maximum value of capital K¯ is determined by ΠpA¯, K¯q  δK¯ where the
profit function is ΠpA,Kq  AKα (see Gomes (2001)). The rest of the parameter
choices are close to those in Gomes (2001) and Hennessy & Whited (2007). We set
autoregressive coefficient ρa to be 0.65 and σa to be 0.15. The financing cost parameter
b is set to be 0.0002. The depreciation rate is set equal to 0.15 and risk-free rate is
0.05.
The procedure for estimation is as follows: For a given set of parameters Θ  rγ αs,
we solve for the value function and the optimal policy function. The goal is to identify
the parameters that match the actual data moments, denoted as Md, with simulated
moments, denoted asmspΘq. The parameter estimates therefore are chosen to minimize













where W is the optimal weighting matrix which is given by the inverse of the variance-
covariance matrix of Md. We create S  6 artificial panels containing 1000 firms
(paths) with 40 time periods. For each path, the log state variable a is restricted
to the discretized set of values. We simulate 60 periods for each firm and drop the
first 20 periods to allow the firms to move away from a possibly suboptimal starting
point (see Hennessy & Whited 2005). At the end of each panel, we run the baseline
regression of investment on q and cash flow. And then we take the average of the cash
flow coefficients and q coefficients over the S panels and form our simulated moments.
The estimation output for each subsample period is reported in Table 2.5. Table 2.5
shows that the capital adjustment cost parameter estimated with simulated method
of moments display an increasing time trend, which is consistent with our previous
findings. It further proves the the increasing pattern of capital adjustment costs is
robust despite different estimation methodology.
Table 2.5: Parameter estimation with simulated method of moments in each subsam-
ple period
β1 is q sensitivity of investment from baseline regression and β2 is cash flow sensitivity of
investment. The second and third columns display β1 and β2 computed from actual data in
each subsample period. The third and fourth column display β1 and β2 computed from data
simulated with the relevant model parameters. The last two columns report the estimated
model parameters γ and α that minimize the weighted distance between the actual moments
and the simulated moments.
Actual Moments Simulated Moments Parameter Estimates
Period β1 β2 β1 β2 γ α
1977-1981 0.0231 0.2830 0.0264 0.2736 0.4866 0.3909
1982-1986 0.0228 0.1351 0.0214 0.1380 0.7860 0.3938
1987-1991 0.0164 0.0650 0.0144 0.0770 1.1009 0.3816
1992-1996 0.0117 0.0528 0.0086 0.0489 1.4680 0.6045
1997-2001 0.0077 0.0266 0.0076 0.0253 1.2753 0.5196
2002-2006 0.0060 0.0055 0.0048 0.0090 6.9163 0.5365
2007-2011 0.0069 -0.0015 0.0044 0.0017 4.4352 0.6955
2012-2016 0.0046 0.0048 0.0027 0.0077 3.2007 0.5941
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2.4.3.2 Time-varying adjustment cost parameter
In this section, we introduce time variations in the model and reexamine the firms’
value-maximization problem under time-varying adjustment cost parameter. In this
situation, managers are fully rational and perceive adjustment costs in the next period
based on what they have observed now. We allow γ to vary according to a finite-state
Markov-chain process. This results in three state variables for the firms’ optimization
problem: profitability shock A, capital stock K and adjustment cost parameter γ. We
rewrite the firm’s value as
V pA,K, γq  max
I






We assume that γ follows a AR(1) process in logs
logpγ 1q  µg   ρglogpγq   σg1g,
where g  Np0, 1q represents the aggregate shock to investment frictions that defines
the general state of the economy. This specific process captures the nature of mean
reversion, which is important to obtain the stationarity for capital adjustment costs in
the long run. 1 ρg defines the speed of mean reversion and 0   ρg   1 to ensure that




the mean level that logpγq tend to revert to. σg is the process volatility. This initial
level of γ (denoted as γ0) matters as it determines the trend of the process. The mean





p1ρ2gq . If the initial level is lower (higher) than the
mean level, then γ tends to rise (fall) over time. The parameters picked to reproduce
the time-series pattern of investment-cash flow sensitivity estimated in the actual data
are hence rγ0 ρg µg σg αs (see Section 2.4.3 for the selection of α). For the parameter
set chosen, we solve for the model and simulate one time-series of γ for all firms and
one time-series of A for each of the firm. Our simulation consists of 10 panels, each of
which includes 1000 firms and 80 model periods. We start the simulation with the
randomly-drawn firm-specific profit shocks (A) and the corresponding no-adjustment-
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cost steady-state capital (K). We allow γ to be fixed at γ0 for the first 20 periods
before we remove them to eliminate the impact of the initial condition. We intend to
match the simulated cash flow coefficients (β2) estimated per model period to those
estimated yearly from the actual data. This is equivalent to matching 40 moments,
each corresponding to the cash flow coefficient in one year.
Estimation is carried out to match the time-series variation of β2. The parameter set
that deliver the pattern closest to that in the actual data is outlined in Table 2.6. The
left graph in Figure 2.1 plots the process of adjustment cost parameter simulated with
the parameter set. It starts from the value of around 1.7 and increases up to 3.3. The
corresponding investment-cash flow sensitivity regressed with the model-simulated
data is plotted in solid line on the right graph. The deviations of simulated β2 from
actual β2 are generally small except for a few years at the beginning. Again, the rising
trend of γ is observed, which accounts for the decreasing pattern of β2
Table 2.6: Parameter estimation results
The table represents the output for parameter estimates governing the stochastic process of
adjustment cost parameter. If the initial level, γ0, is lower (higher) than the long-run mean
level, then γ tends to rise (fall) over time.
Parameter
Mean reversion coefficient ρg 0.9319
Initial γ γ0 1.7171
Mean of logpγq µg 0.0816
Volatility of logpγq σg 0.0401
Returns to scale α 0.7020






2.4.4 Evidence based on the industry-level data
2.4.4.1 Technological changes and capital adjustment costs
The innovations of technology have evolved significantly over the past 30 years. In
1977, Ken Olsen, who co-founded the Digital Equipment Corporation, said, “There is
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Figure 2.1: Simulated process of γ and estimated β2











Cash flow sensitivity from actual v.s. simulated data
Actual data
Simulated data













Simulated process for adjustment cost
The left graph plots the evolution of adjustment cost parameter simulated with the parameter
set in Table 2.6. The solid line in the right graph plots the corresponding investment-cash
flow sensitivity regressed with the model-simulated data and the dots display the cash flow
coefficients regressed with actual data.
no reason for any individual to have a computer in his home”. Nowadays, almost every
individual owns at least one personal computer at home. According to a business
review from The Economist, technological breakthroughs can be disruptive as “they
completely overturn existing products and markets” (Economist n.d.). An industry
report from PwC has referred to 3D printing as a disruptive technology and the costs
that ensue are the shortage of talent, the need to establish digital platforms and
to restructure the current operations and, the demand for a new system to permit
integration of activities (PwC 2016). Based on a business report from McKinsey
(McKinsey & Company 2017), the manufacturing organizations have entered a new era
with the advances in automation, robotics and artificial intelligence, which necessitate
the adaption, integration and development of the technology into business solutions
and the time costs for labor to retrain into the high-skill positions. Current economic
literature, based on industry-level evidence, provides some insights into the evolution
of adjustment costs relating to the technological development. Technological progress
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may lead to large capital adjustment costs. For example, Hornstein & Krusell (1996)
and Greenwood & Yorukoglu (1997) suggest that technological improvement can
cause productivity slowdown as the adoption of new capital introduces high costs
of learning. (Even though there is ongoing debate about the relationship between
technology and productivity growth because the measurement of productivity is not
definitive, their arguments do not provide inferences about the effect of technology
on capital adjustment costs.) Kiley (2001) presents evidence of large costs associated
with training and maintaining information technologies. Bessen (2002) ascribes the
possible cause of the rise in adjustment costs to the rise in information technology
spending, e.g., customization of softwares. Groth (2008) estimates that it is more
costly to install capital in ICT-intensive (ICT standing for information-communication
technology) industries (see also Bessen (2002) for high adjustment costs estimated for
high-tech industries). Uchida, Takeda & Shirai (2012) can only identify costs of capital
adjustment for the sectors that have undergone a technological change in automobile
electronics. Although Meghir, Ryan & Van Reenen (1996) challenge the technologically
sluggish arguments and assert that innovative firms face lower adjustment costs as
innovation brings them more flexibility (see also Smolny (1998) for relevant statement),
their approach differs from from us as they draw inference from the evidence in the
labor market.
As documented in Gordon (1990), the rate of technology growth, as implied by the
decline in the relative price of investment goods, has been remarkable (Oliner &
Sichel 2000, Jorgenson & Stiroh 2000). In Figure 2.2, we illustrate the trend in
technological innovations. The figure shows that the acquisition of equipment and
computer software in US has increased over time, although experiencing a decline due
to the impact of the financial crisis. With high-tech equipment embedded into the
work, the lack of technical skills to install and operate the equipment seems to be
a significant problem. Firms, in order to prevent the loss of committed employees,
need to provide proper training to help their workforce adapt to the new machines
and tools. The workers, while devoting extra hours to acquiring new skills, have to
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forgo some output, which constitutes a substantial part of capital adjustment costs .
We refer to the education and training participation rate in European countries to
draw inference about the participation of training program in the US. The data is
extracted from Eurostat (the earliest data for training participation rate is 1992) and
we plot the average of participation rate in education and training by employed persons
across Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Portugal, Germany, Greece, Italy,
Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and United
Kingdom from 1992 to 2017 in Figure 2.2(b). The percentage of employees taking part
in eduction and training climb to around 14% in the recent years from 6% in 1990.
The rise in the participation rate in education and training programs indicates higher
training fees or learning costs accompanying the adoption of new technology, which
provides a basis for the increasing capital adjustment costs.
Figure 2.2: The acquisition of high-tech equipment and participation of training by
workers
(a) ICT acquisition (b) Participation in education and training
Figure 2.2(a) plots the acquisition of equipment and computer software that is used in
production for more than one year from 1985 to 2011 for US. Figure 2.2(b) plots the average
percentage of employed persons in European countries that have taken part in education
and training from 1992 to 2017.
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2.4.4.2 Estimation with industry-level data
Following the literature that relates adjustment costs to productivity growth, we
adopt the approach of Bessen (2002) and estimate the trend of adjustment costs with
4-digit SIC code industry-level data drawn from “NBER-CES Manufacturing Industry
Database” covering periods between 1977 and 2011. The adjustment cost is defined
as the deviation of the actual output from the potential output. For each industry
j, we have Yt  Y t p1  Gtq where the potential output is Y t  AtKαK,tt MαM,tt LαL,tt
(At denotes productivity shock, Mt defines material input, Lt is labor input, αK,t
(αM,t, αL,t) is capital (material, labor) share) and actual output is Yt. Gt  γ It1Kt1 is
adjustment cost per unit of potential output which is linearly related to the lagged
investment-capital ratio. 1Gt is analogous to the speed of adjustment (SOA) in the
partial adjustment model of Lintner (1956) (see also SOA under the framework of
capital structure in Flannery & Rangan (2006)). The SOA in this context is the rate
at which firm adjusts the output to its target (potential) level. Low 1 Gt indicates
low speed of adjustment or high level of adjustment costs. For the industry j at time
t, we take logs, take difference and rearrange Yjt  Y jtp1 Gjtq and then we yield (p.
denotes log change)
xZjt  xYjt  αK,jtyKjt  αM,jtyMjt  αL,jtxLjt  xAjt  γ∆ Ijt1
Kjt1
,
and γ can be estimated by regressing xZjt on ∆ Ijt1Kjt1 . In order to gauge the time pattern
of adjustment costs, we include the period trend variable T which is 1 in 1977-1981, 2
in 1982-1987 and so forth. Table 2.7 presents the regression output for the pattern
of adjustment cost. The coefficient on T  ∆ Ijt1
Kjt1
shows that the adjustment cost
parameter has increased by 0.05 in each period when year dummies are not included
and increased by 0.015, although it is statistically insignificant, when time fixed effect
is accounted for. Even though the increasing trend of adjustment costs is attenuated
when aggregate shocks are controlled for, the coefficient on T  ∆ Ijt1
Kjt1
produces the
right sign and demonstrates an increase in adjustment costs. To sum up, combining
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the time-series evolution of adjustment cost parameter γ with its negative impact on
I-CF sensitivity, we accept our second prediction and argue that the declining trend of
I-CF sensitivity can be explained by the rising adjustment cost parameter.
Table 2.7: Adjustment to the potential output level
The OLS regression output are based on data from "NBER-CES Manufacturing Industry
Database" covering periods between 1977 and 2011. The dependent variable is productivity
residual growth xZjt as described in Bessen (2002). The explanatory variables are lagged
change of investment-capital ratio ∆ Ijt1Kjt1 , interaction term between period trend variable
T and lagged change of investment-capital ratio. Period trend variable is defined as 1 in
1977-1981 and 2 in 1982-1986 and so forth. Standard errors are clustered in industry level and
reported in parenthesis. Adjusted R square is also reported. , , indicate significance
at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.











Industry dummies Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes
R2a 0.015 0.014 0.127
The following regression output is based on stochastic frontier model.. The data variables is
as described above , , indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.















2.5.1 Cross-country evidence based on Moshirian et al. (2017)
Moshirian et al. (2017) examine the difference in I-CF sensitivities between the
firms from the developed economies and those from the developing countries. They
demonstrate that the decrease in I-CF sensitivities is significant for developed countries
and moderate for developing economies. They introduce the role of asset tangibility.
They argue that the decline in the importance or the productivity of tangible asset
and also the decline in the income predicability leads to the decreasing pattern of I-CF
sensitivities in the “new economy”. 11
However, in this paper, we provide an alternative explanations for the observed
difference in I-CF sensitivities between developed economies and developing economies.
Firms in the developed countries are faster in adopting the technology-intensive
physical capital and hence should experience a more significant increase in the capital
adjustment costs over time. Therefore, their I-CF sensitivities decline substantially
even though the productivity of physical capital is held constant or fully controlled
for. Firms in the developing economies, however, face a moderate growth in their
technologies and capital adjustment costs. Therefore, their I-CF sensitivities should
decline at a lower pace or face no decline until recently.
2.5.2 Cross-industry regression results
As a robustness check, we divide the manufacturing firms based on the definition in
Chen & Chen (2012) into three industry groups: durables, nondurables, and high-tech
11As I-CF sensitivities refers to the estimated coefficient on cash flow after controlling for Tobin’s
q, which is the proxy for the marginal productivity of physical capital, the argument is aligned with
the measurement error theory of q (Erickson & Whited 2000). Cash flow contains the information
regarding the productivity of tangible asset as Tobin’s q does a poor job in capturing it. And the low
I-CF sensitivity in the recent periods is the result of the low measurement error in q, which makes
cash flow become a less predictable variable for investment.
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industries. Within each industry group, we run the baseline regression from 1977-1981
to 2012-2016. As high-tech firms possess higher proportion of technology-intensive
capital as compared to non-hightech groups, we expect that the high-tech groups
undergo higher increase in capital adjustment costs over time and thereby more decline
in I-CF sensitivity. Table 2.8 shows a decreasing pattern of I-CF sensitivity regardless
of the industry group the firms belong to. It also shows that I-CF sensitivity for
the high-tech industries has shrunk more severely in 2000s than the other industry
groups. It starts to disappear in 2002-2006 and remains comparatively low in recent
decades compared with other industry groups. In order to provide a more concrete
comparison of the declining trend of I-CF sensitivity across industries, we estimate β2
by year and regress the natural log of β2 on year trend variable which is equal to 1 for
1977, 2 for 1978 and so forth (the corresponding regression estimates is denoted as η).
Table 2.9 reveals that I-CF sensitivity drops by 9.3% (5.4%) for durables (nondurables)
every year while β2 decreases by 11.5% every year for high-tech groups. To get a
clearer picture, we also report the t statistics and the corresponding p values for
the null hypothesis that the declining trend of β2 is the same between high-tech and
durables (nondurables). Both comparisons (high-tech v.s. durable and high-tech v.s.
nondurable) show that the declining trend of β2 (captured by η) is significantly more
prominent for high-tech groups than that for durable groups and nondurable groups.
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Table 2.8: Estimation across industry groups
The table reports the estimation results for the industry group in each of the panel. The
second and third column in the table report q coefficient and cash flow coefficient estimated
from baseline linear regression. The fifth and sixth column report γ and b estimated based
on the q equation. The results are displayed for each industry group: durables, nondurables
and high-tech industries. p value for the null hypothesis that the coefficients are the same
between the first period and the last period is reported below. , , indicate significance
at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.
Durables: Nondurables: High-tech:
Period β1 β2 β1 β2 β1 β2
1977-1981 0.017 0.287 0.021 0.287 0.034 0.289
1982-1986 0.023 0.139 0.018 0.177 0.024 0.117
1987-1991 0.013 0.066 0.017 0.093 0.017 0.059
1992-1996 0.011 0.066 0.009 0.046 0.012 0.05
1997-2001 0.011 0.036 0.013 0.044 0.007 0.018
2002-2006 0.009 0.016 0.006 0.017 0.006 -0.001
2007-2011 0.009 -0.004 0.009 0.004 0.006 -0.004
2012-2016 0.005 0.012 0.003 0.006 0.005 0.002
p value 0.076 0.000 0.010 0.000 0.000 0.000
Table 2.9: Comparisons of the trend in β2 across industry groups
The table shows estimates of the declining trend for β2, denoted as η, across each industry
group, namely durables, nondurables and high-tech. η is estimated by regressing the natural
log of β2 on year trend variable, which is equal to 1 for 1977, 2 for 1978 and so forth. Robust
standard errors are shown in parenthesis. t statistics and corresponding p values for the null
hypothesis that the declining trend is the same between high-tech and durables (nondurables)
are reported. , , indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.
Durable Nondurable High-tech
η -0.093 -0.054 -0.115
(0.009) (0.009) (0.006)
H0: η(High-tech)=η(Durable)
t stats: -1.739 p value: 0.086
H0: η(High-tech)=η(Nondurable)
t stats: -5.391 p value: 0.000
The comparison of declining trend is further illustrated in Figure 2.3 with scatter plots
and exponential curve fitting. The observation that high-tech firms have experienced
more decline in their I-CF sensitivities is consistent with the fact they have incurred
higher costs in capital adjustment over time. In all, based on the increasing adoption
of information technology and communications equipment and computer software (as
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Figure 2.3: Investment-cash flow sensitivity across industries by year (fitted with an
exponential curve)
High-tech v.s. Durable goods
High-tech v.s. Nondurable goods
Note: The top graph shows the scatter plots of investment-cash flow sensitivities estimated
for high-tech (blue) v.s. durable (red) industry fitted with an exponential curve from 1977
to 2016. The bottom graph shows the scatter plots of investment-cash flow sensitivities
estimated for high-tech (blue) v.s. nondurable (red) industry fitted with an exponential
curve from 1977 to 2016.
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shown in Figure 2.2(a)), the low I-CF sensitivity we observe in the late years aligns
with the fact the firms has shifted towards high-tech machines and equipment, which
incurred higher costs in installation and adjustment.
2.6 Conclusions
We study the I-CF sensitivity phenomenon in a time series context to address the
puzzling question of the reason behind the gradual decline of this sensitivity over
time. We focus our attention on two key factors inspired by a neoclassical investment
framework with costly external financing: financial frictions and capital adjustment
costs. To evaluate whether those factors contribute to the declining pattern of I-CF
sensitivity, we use a broad set of tests ranging from a nonlinear estimation of the first
order condition, a GMM estimation of Euler equation to a structural estimation of
the parameters.
We demonstrate that while I-CF sensitivity is a specific function of both financial
constraints and capital adjustment costs, it is mainly the evolution over time of the
latter that is capable of explaining the declining I-CF pattern. As firms need to
allocate their internal funds to the finance of both investment and capital adjustment
costs, higher adjustment costs will lead to a lower sensitivity of investment to cash
flow. We show that capital adjustment costs have demonstrated an increasing time
trend, which explains why I-CF sensitivity has declined over time.
Consistent with the extant literature, we do not find evidence of the sufficient changes
in the magnitude of financing frictions that would be consistent with the observed
pattern. More generally, we demonstrate that the I-CF sensitivity reflects not only
financing but also real frictions. This observation has implications for the design of
empirical tests of financing constraints using the I-CF framework, which need to take
into account effects of technological change leading to variations in the cost of capital
stock adjustment.
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2.A. Derivation of the profit function
To derive the profit function of the firm, consider first its Cobb-Douglas production
function
F pA˜,K, L,Mq  A˜KαKMαMLαL ,
where A˜ indexes technology shock, K is physical capital input, M is material input
and L is labor input. Denote p as output price and assume price is taken as given
in a competitive market. pM is price for material, W is wage (price for labor input).
Assume labor and material input are short-run flexible factors, we had the profit




Take derivative with respect to L and M , we have
WL  pαLA˜KαKMαMLαL , (2.A.1)
pMM  pαM A˜KαKMαMLαL . (2.A.2)
Substitute the optimal L and M back into profit function, we have
Π  AKα,




















2.B. Model in a perfect capital market
In this appendix, we derive the optimality condition assuming external financing is
frictionless. There is a perfect capital market and hence any shortage of funds to
finance the investment can be raised from external market costlessly. The Bellman
equation characterizing the firm’s dynamic optimization problem is
V pAt, Ktq  max
It
pΠpAt, Ktq  It GpIt, Ktqq   θEAt 1|AtV pAt 1, Kt 1q , (2.B.3)
where θ denotes the discount factor and the marginal Tobin’s q is βEAt 1|AtVKpAt 1, Kt 1q.
The first-order condition with respect to It yields
qt  1   γ It
Kt
. (2.B.4)
We have therefore arrived at the q equation which equates the marginal return of








Therefore, under perfect capital market, the marginal q is a sufficient statistic for
corporate investment.
Extant empirical work tends to include cash flow as an additional variable when
running the regression of investment. The following baseline regression is typically
used (cf. Fazzari et al.):
It
Kt
 β0   β1qt   β2CFt
Kt
  εt. (2.B.5)
It is worth noting that cash flow variable (CF
K
) is added to the regression in an ad hoc
way and marginal q is frequently proxied by average q, defined as the market value of
capital over the book value of capital. If the assumptions of linear homogeneity and
perfect competition stated in Hayashi (1982) hold, Tobin’s average q will be a perfect
proxy for marginal q. As marginal q is the sole statistic for investment in a perfect
capital market, β2 should therefore be zero.
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2.C. Derivation of I-CF and I-q sensitivities
Calculation of the partial derivative of investment with respect to cash flow is performed



























BΠ{K  bΦ  0.




γpψ  1qp I
K
qψ2   bΦ . (2.C.2)














γpψ  1qp I
K
qψ2   bΦ . (2.C.3)
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2.D. Euler investment equation: An empirical coun-
terpart
The estimation equation for the Euler investment equation is derived as follows. The
firm aims to maximize expected discounted value of the stream of future net profit
where






1   r q
τtpΠpAτ , Kτ q  Iτ GpIτ , Kτ q HpXτ , Kτ qq,
(2.D.1)
subject to It  Kt 1  p1  δqKt. The functions are as previously defined. The







1   r q
τtpΠpAτ , Kτ qIτGpIτ , Kτ qHpXτ , Kτ q qτ pIτ p1δqKτKτ 1qq,
where qt is the shadow price of capital. First order condition with respect to It, Kt 1
have BL

























p1   rqτt r
BΠpAτ , Kτ q
BKτ 
BGpIτ , Kτ q
BKτ 
BHpXτ , Kτ q
BKτ s. (2.D.4)
Substitute (2.D.2) into (2.D.3), we have















In writing the empirical equation, we assume that production function displays constant










































Adding an expectation error t 1 where Etpt 1q  0 to remove the expectation
operator, we arrive at the estimation equation for the Euler equation:
1
1   r
























































2.E. I-CF sensitivity with nonconvex and convex
capital adjustment costs
As in Whited (2006), we consider the fact that investment incurs fixed (nonconvex)
costs which are proportional to the capital stock, denoted as fK. The fixed costs only
occur during periods of active investment. As stated in Cooper & Haltiwanger (2006),
the fixed costs reflect the needs for restructuring and retraining of the activities and
therefore they only take place when new investment is made. The firm value V pAt, Ktq
is therefore written as:
V pAt, Ktq  maxtV apAt, Ktq, V npAt, Ktqu, (2.E.1)
in which V npAt, Ktq (V apAt, Ktq) reflects the firm value when no (active) investment
is made. The corresponding Bellman equations are:
V apAt, Ktq  max
It
rpΠpAt, KtqItfKGpIt, KtqHpXt, Ktqq θEAt 1|AtV pAt 1, Kt 1qs,
and
V npAt, Ktq  rΠpAt, Ktq   θEAt 1|AtV pAt 1, p1  δqKtqs.

















where qt  θEAt 1|AtV aKpAt 1, Kt 1q. Consider 1pI ¡ 0q as the indictor that active




γpψ  1qp I
K
qψ2   bΦ1pI ¡ 0q. (2.E.3)
It can be seen that a fixed cost of capital adjustment influences I-CF sensitivity by
affecting the probability of making active investment. High fixed cost f decreases the
probability of active investment and the mean value of 1pI ¡ 0q and leads to a lower
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I-CF sensitivity. Nonetheless, in the firm-level data, we can rarely observe the inactive
investment (thereby 1pI ¡ 0q is always 1), which make it difficult to identify the effect
of a fixed cost on the cash flow sensitivity of investment.
2.F. Estimations without winsorization
This Appendix provide the baseline regression results and nonlinear estimations results
of q equation for data without winsorization. The estimates of I-CF sensitivity,
namely β2, also steadily decline over time. The rising trend of capital adjustment cost
parameters is still prominent for the data without winsorization.
Table 2.10: Baseline regression and estimation of q equation without winsorization
This table on the left side reports estimation results from baseline linear regression model
Iit
Kit1
 β0   β1Qit1   β2
CFit
Kit1
  ηi   ηt   εit in each five-year subsample period. IitKit1 ,
CFit
Kit1
, Qit1, ηi, ηt are all as previously described. The table on the right side reports the
estimates for γ, ψ and b based on Eqn (2.5). Adjusted R square R2a are reported. , ,
indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.
Period β1 β2 R2a γ ψ b R2a
1977-1981 0.019 0.246 0.568 2.620 1.773 0.910 0.164
(0.007) (0.039) (0.295) (0.157) (0.784)
1982-1986 0.020 0.091 0.515 6.374 1.724 0.101 0.181
(0.005) (0.021) (0.178) (0.052) (0.186)
1987-1991 0.013 0.054 0.538 6.778 1.935 1.067 0.140
0.003 0.013 (0.363) (0.103) (0.241)
1992-1996 0.006 0.029 0.607 15.618 1.802 2.678 0.090
0.001 0.012 (1.876) (0.159) (0.707)
1997-2001 0.005 0.010 0.540 21.472 1.729 1.535 0.155
0.001 0.006 (1.228) (0.078) (0.345)
2002-2006 0.004 0.001 0.575 35.495 1.841 2.726 0.251
0.001 0.005 (0.883) (0.048) (0.536)
2007-2011 0.004 -0.012 0.466 28.633 1.666 3.280 0.206
0.001 0.007 (1.479) (0.098) (1.265)
2012-2016 0.004 -0.001 0.607 38.895 1.900 3.586 0.389
0.001 0.006 (1.849) (0.103) (0.132)
Chapter 3
The prolonged effect of collateral shocks in
the context of capital and labor dynamics
3.1 Introduction
The recent 2007-09 financial crisis, driven by the plummeting land prices, has led to
a contraction in credit supply and an ongoing prolonged slump in economic output,
business investment and employment. During the financial crisis, 40%-90% of one
years’ output was foregone (Atkinson et al. 2013), the employment ratio decreased
from 63% in 2007 to 58% in 2009 (Mian & Sufi 2014), constrained firms had deep cuts
in capital spending (Campello et al. 2010). U.S. housing prices plummeted, which had
a significant impact on the firms’ financial activities as most of corporate loans were
secured by the pledgable collateral (Berger & Udell 1990). In particular, Reinhart
& Rogoff (2009) show that a substantial part of the costs from financial crises is a
slow trajectory of economic growth.1 How do firms respond to the shocks in the credit
market due to the sharp decline in collateral value? Do financial crises result in a
temporary slowdown of corporate behavior or exert a long-lasting adverse impact? Do
the presence of financial and real frictions impedes the speed of asset recovery and are
the growth paths influenced by the status of the firms? This chapter attempts to shed
light on the above questions.
1See also Reinhart & Rogoff (2014) and Papell & Ruxandra (2012) for evidence of slow economic
growth and protracted economic recession.
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The collapse of the U.S. real estate market has generated a substantial interest in
understanding the link between collateral value and the firms’ real outcomes via the
collateral-based lending channel (e.g., Kiyotaki & Moore 1997, Gan 2007, Chaney
et al. 2012, Liu et al. 2013, Ersahin & Irani 2017). In an environment where a firm’s
borrowing capacity is subject to collateral constraints due to the limited enforcement,2
the price of collateral assets affects the value creditor can recover upon default. It hence
affects the amount of debt borrowers can obtain to finance their factor demands. Liu,
Wang & Zha (2013) show that real estate comprises a large proportion of collateral asset
and Zhang et al. (2017) find that banks reduce their lending significantly as a result of
the residential property market collapse.3 Therefore, the fluctuations in the housing
market may spill over to the firms’ real-side outcomes by affecting the access to credit
via the collateral constraints. Empirical researchers face challenges in establishing
the link between financial (credit supply) shocks and real outcomes as credit market
disruptions are always accompanied by the weakening of business demands for credit.
Moreover, the presence of capital market imperfections can propagate and amplify the
shocks from the real economy (e.g., productivity shocks) during the crisis (Bernanke
et al. 1999), which makes it hard to disentangle the shocks in the financial sector from
the shocks in the real economy.
My model is built on DeAngelo et al. (2011) with an extension of labor market frictions
and shocks from the financial (collateral-based) sector. The dynamic structural
model features the firm’s optimal investment policy, employment choice and financing
decisions. The model includes two sources of disturbances: productivity shocks,
individual and aggregate, as well as collateral shocks, which affect the liquidation
value of capital recovered by the lender upon default. I attempt to disentangle the
effect of credit supply shocks from credit demand shocks by modelling productivity
2Studies suggesting that firms must pledge collateral to secure the promises to pay and the
ability to do so can enlarge the firms’ debt capacity include Berger & Udell (1990), Jimenez et al.
(2006), Eisfeldt & Rampini (2008), Benmelech & Bergman (2009), Chaney et al. (2012), Rampini &
Viswanathan (2010)
3Huang & Stephens (2015) also discuss the effect of housing market on the reduction of credit
availability.
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and collateral shocks as two independent random processes. The model embeds a rich
set of real frictions and financial frictions. When firms adjust their capital stock, they
are subject to capital adjustment costs and investment irreversibility under which
it is more costly to cut capital than to expand it. More importantly, I incorporate
frictions from the labor market, i.e., costs from changing labor input and inability to
adjust wages. Firms are subject to financial frictions when they finance their factor
demand with costly external financing, i.e., debt and equity, when their internal funds
are depleted. Debt capacity is limited by collateral constraints and a negative shock
in collateral value reduces the firms’ ability to borrow. Equity financing entails costs
arising from asymmetric information problems and security flotations.
The model shows that an adverse shock to the collateral value leads to a large and
protracted decline in output level, capital stock, employment, firm value and the
resulting recovery is slow and does not revert to the pre-shock level over a long
horizon. Investment and net borrowing experience a steep decline upon the impact.
The response to the collateral shock, however, is mitigated when the economy is hit
by a productivity (demand) shock simultaneously. When the business demand is
depressed during the financial crisis, the negative impact of credit supply shortage
(collateral-driven) is substantially mitigated as the firms have lower financing needs.
The interaction between these two types of shocks manifests the challenge faced by the
empirical researchers to disentangle the effect of credit supply from the firms’ demand
for credit. The contraction of the firms’ activity during the crisis can not be purely
ascribed to a shock from the supply-side when it is accompanied by a demand-side
shock.
I examine whether the negative economic outcomes depend on the types of shocks
and the status of firms. In particular, I conduct comparative statics to examine how
the impact of different shocks changes with the nature of financial and labor market
frictions. Firstly, I show that debt issuance drops (i.e., is procyclical) when either an
adverse productivity shock or collateral shock hits. Equity issuance increases with the
negative collateral shock (countercyclical) and decreases with the negative productivity
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shock (procyclical). The cyclicality of equity financing depends not only on the types
of shocks, but also the financial status of firms. The adverse collateral shock leads to a
larger increase of equity issuance for financially unconstrained firms (firms with lower
equity issuance costs) as they are in a better position to offset the negative impact
on the debt capacity during the worsening of credit conditions by selling equity. For
investment decisions, consistent with Hennessy & Whited (2007), I show that the
costs of equity financing dampen the response of investment to the productivity shock.
Secondly, I find that lowering labor adjustment costs fares better for small firms than
for large ones. Also, firms with costless labor adjustment cut investment and hiring
less aggressively following a collateral shock, however, they choose to shed workers or
stop hiring and reduce their investment to a greater extent in the face of depressed
business demands, i.e., when the negative productivity shock hits.
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 3.2 outlines the literature
mostly related to my work. Section 3.3 shows a overview of the recent financial crisis
in the US. Section 3.4 describes the benchmark model and provides analysis for
the firms’ optimal decisions. Section 3.5 discusses the model calibration and model
solution before plotting the policy functions. Section 3.6 studies the implications of
the productivity shock and the collateral shock. Section 3.7 performs comparative
statics and analyzes how the firms’ responses to the shocks vary by the firm types and
the nature of frictions. Section 3.8 draws conclusions.
3.2 Related literature
This chapter contributes to various strands of literature in corporate finance, financial
crises and labor economics. First, I add to a growing body of research in an effort
to explore the link between financial crisis and real economy. More specifically, by
exploring the channel of collateral constraints, I give a role to the shocks originating
from the financial sector in explaining the steep decline and the slow recovery in real
outcomes. The important challenge posed to the analyses of financial crisis is the
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separation of credit supply effect from its demand effect. A small set of papers try to
address the link through the demand effect. Bernanke, Lown & Friedman (1991) point
out that failing credit demand during the credit crunch caused much of the slowdown
of economy. Mian & Sufi (2012) point to the aggregate demand channel in accounting
for significant job loss and Mian, Rao & Sufi (2013) support the household demand
view as leveraged households decrease their spending drastically after the collapse of
housing prices.4 On the other hand, some authors argue that shocks from credit supply
played a more crucial part in triggering the macroeconomic effect of the crisis (e.g.,
Peek & Rosengren 2000, Dell’Ariccia et al. 2008, Kroszner et al. 2007, Braun & Larrain
2005) and in influencing the firm-level decision (e.g., Campello et al. 2010, Almeida
et al. 2012, Duchin et al. 2010, Chodorow-Reich 2013). There is a long-standing effort
in macroeconomics and corporate finance which aims to examine the role of credit
market imperfections in propagating the shocks originating from the real economy,
e.g., productivity shocks.5 However, the importance of shocks originating from the
financial sector has begun to receive attention only recently. Ajello (2016) maintain
that the shocks to the financial intermediation costs can explain most of the business
fluctuations. My paper follows in the spirit of Jermann & Quadrini (2012), Khan
& Thomas (2013), Liu et al. (2013) and Zetlin-Jones & Shourideh (2017) in that
I model credit supply shock as a shock to the collateralized borrowing constraints
and examine their impact on the real and financial behavior. Jermann & Quadrini
(2012) and Liu et al. (2013) do not differentiate among different types of firms and
assign no role to the frictions stemming from the real-side activities such as wage
rigidities, labor market frictions and investment irreversibility. Khan & Thomas (2013)
and Zetlin-Jones & Shourideh (2017) both argue that financial shocks can generate
a misallocation of capital and a disruption to the measured aggregate productivity.
4See also Eggertsson & Krugman (2012),Iacoviello (2005), Iacoviello & Neri (2010), Guerrieri &
Lorenzoni (2017) for the household demand view.
5One example of macroeconomic literature is Bernanke et al. (1999) in which credit market
imperfections such as asymmetries of information can act as “financial accelerator” and propagate,
mostly amplify, the shocks to the real economy. Hennessy & Whited (2007) show that firm-level
investment respond less aggressively to the profit shocks in the face of high equity financing costs.
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By assuming that resource reallocation following the financial shocks is the driving
force behind the variations in product demand, these papers face the difficulties in
separating the effect of credit supply from the demand effect. Moreover, both of them
focus on the contraction in borrowing and pay little attention to the alternative source
of financing, i.e., equity, as firms are able to substitute away from debt financing with
equity issuance. And my framework departs from theirs in the sense that I characterize
endogenous borrowing limits by taking into account the ability of investment to relax
the collateral constraints in the current period.
At the same time, this chapter builds on the previous attempts to explain the prolonged
nature of economic recessions. Cerra & Saxena (2008) find that output loss from
financial crises persists even at the ten-year horizon. Reinhart & Rogoff (2009) show
that the negative impact of financial crises is highly persistent with housing market
collapse lasting for over six years on average. Unemployment spikes on average lingers
for five years. Reinhart & Rogoff (2014) study 100 systemic banking crises and find that
it takes around eight years for output level to reach the pre-crisis level. Theoretically,
Khan & Thomas (2013) show that the credit shocks lead to a slow recovery of GDP
during the financial crisis via increased capital and productivity reallocation, although
leaving the weak growth of investment and employment unexplained. I consider a full
range of real frictions and financial frictions, i.e., labor market frictions and the costs
of equity financing, and gauge the extent to which each of the frictions contributes
to the decline and the gradual recovery of corporate activities. I also deviate from
Khan & Thomas (2013) as I examine the role of collateral shocks without triggering a
deterioration in aggregate productivity. By evaluating the reaction of different kinds
of firm, my work is close to Zetlin-Jones & Shourideh (2017) in that I show that the
importance of financial and real frictions varies by the firm types.
Second, the chapter adds to the extant literature by assigning a central role to collateral
in the understanding of corporate investment, employment and leverage decisions.
The plummeting of the housing market at the onset of the financial crisis underlines
the importance of collateral channel as it curtails the borrowing capacity of a firm by
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affecting the lender’s ability to repossess collateral. Chaney et al. (2012) and Gan
(2007) show that an adverse shock to collateral value leads to a substantial drop in
investment. Schmalz et al. (2017) argue that an rise in collateral value can increase
the chance of starting up a new business. Ersahin & Irani (2017) discover that firms
increase employment in response to the appreciation of real estate values. Rampini &
Viswanathan (2010) argue that firms subject to collateral constraints may choose to
engage in risk management and conserve debt capacity and Rampini & Viswanathan
(2013) and Campello & Giambona (2013) find that asset tangibility, or redeployability,
has important implications for firm’s capital structure decisions. More recently, Li
et al. (2016) find that collateral constraints are of central importance as they create
incentives to preserve debt capacity. My work, relying on the framework of a financial
crisis, abstracts from the prior studies that firms curtail their spending on capital and
labor when credit tightens as a result of the fall in collateral value.
Third, this work is related to the literature on financial constraints and labor. Mona-
celli et al. (2011) argue that the credit contraction leads to a sluggish recovery of
unemployment as lower debt allows the workers to bargain for higher wage in recessions.
Michaels et al. (2016) show that increased cost of funds reduce employment and labor
earnings. On the empirical side, Chodorow-Reich (2013) find that firms with pre-crisis
unhealthy lenders reduce their employment by more. Duygan-Bump et al. (2015)
show that credit supply shocks cause more employees working for firms dependent on
external finance to lose their jobs. Caggese et al. (2016) find that financial frictions
distort firms’ hiring decision. I model reduced borrowing capacity due to the tighten-
ing collateral constraints as a conduit for the firms to downsize their labor force and
examine how the relationship varies with the nature of labor market frictions.
3.3 Overview of the 2007-09 financial crisis
The 2007-09 financial crisis was associated with a steep decline in economic activities
and a protracted nature of the collapse. Figure 3.1 plots the percentage change from
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2007Q4 of real GDP, all-transactions house price index (estimated using sales prices
and appraisal data), gross private domestic investment and employment-to-population
ratio. The movement of real GDP at the beginning was small and the largest drop was
observed in 2009Q2, in which real GDP declined by 5.5% compared to 2007Q4. The
GDP recovered slowly and reverted to the pre-crisis level in 2013Q4. The house price
as represented by the house price index from the Federal Housing Finance Agency
exhibited a significant and persistent deterioration. The house price index continued
to drop until 2012Q2 and did not move back the pre-crisis boom until 2016Q3. The
greatest decline of house price index came late and amounted to around 18% in 2012Q2.
Gross private domestic investment experienced a steep decline. It dropped by 30% in
2009Q3 and returned to the 2007Q4 level in 2013Q3. Employment-to-population ratio
decreased from 62.8% in 2007Q4 to 58.3% in 2010Q4. It remained at low state and
did not revert to the pre-crisis level even until 2017Q4.
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Figure 3.1: An overview of economic activities in 2007-09 recession
Note: Figure 3.1 plots the time-series evolution of main economic variables after the 2007-
09 financial crisis. Real GDP per capita, gross investment are extracted from Bureau
of Economic Analysis (BEA). All-Transactions House Price Index is drawn from Federal
Housing Finance Agency. Employment-to-population ratio is obtained from Bureau of Labor
Statistics (BLS). All series are plotted as percentage change from the level in 2007Q4.
To understand the link between credit market and real corporate outcomes, I examine
the impact of financial crisis on the firm-level investment and employment. The
decrease in the supply of credit should hinder investment (employment) when the
firms’ accessible funds fail to meet their investment (employment) demands. The effects
of credit constraints are more severe for firms with high target level of investment.
For firms lacking profitable investment opportunities and having lower demands for
funds, the shortage of external financing becomes less of a concern. I compare the
investment and employment growth of firms with different levels of pre-shock investment
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opportunities before and after the onset of the crisis by employing a differences-in-
differences strategy. In order to divide the sample into pre-crisis and post-crisis period,
I extract quarterly data from Compustat between 2007 and 2017 and adjust the
fiscal year a quarter ahead. In August 2007, American Home Mortgage Investment
Corporation files for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection, which propagates the collateral
shocks to the financial institutions 6. Therefore, I identify the post-crisis episode as the
periods after the last quarter of 2007. Specifically, I define year 2007 (pre-crisis period)
as the last quarter in 2006 (fiscal quarter with an end-date after October 1, 2006)
and the first three quarters in 2007 (fiscal quarter with an end-date before October
1, 2007). The rest (between the last quarter in 2007 and the end of 2017) is defined
as the post-crisis period. The estimation is on an annual basis. I exclude financial
firms (SIC between 6000 and 6999), utility firms (SIC between 4900 and 4999) and
public administration (SIC between 9000 and 9999). I discard firm-year observations
that have sales/asset growth higher than 100% and drop observations with sales or
capital stock less than 1 million USD to eliminate the effect of outliers. I measure
investment as capital expenditure scaled by gross property, plant and equipment at
the beginning of the year. I control for firm-specific characteristics by including firm
fixed effects, Q and cash flow. Q is defined as the beginning-of-year market of book of
asset ratio (see Appendix 3.B for the details of constructing Q) and cash flow is the
sum of income before extraordinary item and depreciation scaled by beginning-of-year
gross capital stock. As the data for employment size is only available in the annual file,
I define the pre-crisis period as the fiscal year 2007 for the estimation of employment
growth. Employment growth is the percentage change of current employment from
employment in the previous year. Dummy variables for the post-crisis period (After)
are created and I also generate dummies for each of the post-crisis year to study the
long-run impact. High-Q is an indicator equal to one for the firms that are in the top
quartile of pre-crisis Q distribution.
6See https://www.stlouisfed.org/financial-crisis/full-timeline for the discussion of the timeline for
financial crisis
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Table 3.1: Effects of crisis on investment and employment growth
The table presents the results:
Invit  β0   β1Qit1   β2CF it   β3After   β4After High-Q  ηi   it (1)
Empit  β0   β1Qit1   β2CF it   β3After   β4After High-Q  ηi   it (2)
Invit  β0 β1Qit1 β2CF it γ1D2008 γ2D2009 . . . θ1D2008High-Q θ2D2009High-Q . . . ηi it
(3)
Empit  β0 β1Qit1 β2CF it γ1D2008 γ2D2009 . . . θ1D2008High-Q θ2D2009High-Q . . . ηi it
(4)
Inv is capital expenditure scaled by beginning-of-year gross capital stock. Emp is the
percentage change of current employment from employment in the previous year. Q is the
ratio of market value to book value of asset at the beginning of the year. CF is the sum of
income before extraordinary item and depreciation scaled by beginning-of-year gross capital
stock. After is an indicator equal to one for the post-crisis period. Dn represents dummies
for the year n. High-Q is an indicator equal to one for the firms that have pre-crisis Q higher
than 75th percentile of the distribution. Firm fixed effects ηi are included in the regressions.
(High-Q is measured only once per firm, therefore the firm fixed effects subsume the effects of
High-Q.) Standard errors are clustered at the firm level (shown in the parenthesis). Adjusted
R square and the number of observations are also reported. , , indicate significance at
the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.
Independent variables: Investment: Employment growth:
(1) (2) (3) (4)
After -.042 -.033
(0.004) (0.005)


















Q .031 .029 .028 .026
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
Cash flow .001 .001 0.007 0.006
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R2 0.500 0.513 0.198 0.217
Obs. 17342 17342 23298 23298
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Table 3.1 tabulates the estimation output. Column (1) shows that there is a decline in
investment following the onset of the crisis for and the decline is 2.7% greater for firms
that report high Q in the pre-crisis period. Column (2) shows that investment for
low-Q firms in 2008, 2009, 2016 and 2017 is 0.5%, 4.9%, 7.4% and 8.1% smaller than
the reference year (2007). The coefficient for 2008 dummy is not significant, indicating
a delayed decline for investment. The coefficients on the 2016 and 2017 dummies
are significantly negative, showing that the effect of 2007-09 financial crisis are still
present after a decade. The investment has not recuperated to the pre-crisis level even
in the most recent years. Again, the negative coefficients on the interaction terms
between 2009 dummy and High-Q show that the drop is more severe for firms with
better investment opportunities and, thus, higher financing demands. Column (3) and
(4) examine the behavior of the firms’ employment. There is an immediate significant
drop in employment growth following the onset of the crisis. Similar conclusions are
drawn for employment growth that the negative response to the credit supply shock is
more pronounced for the firms with a high level of pre-shock investment opportunities.
In addition, for employment growth, the gap from the pre-crisis level in the recent
years is still significant.
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3.4 The general model
This section describes my theoretical framework. The model features heterogeneous
firms with different sizes, financial positions, and idiosyncratic productivity. There
are three control variables: the capital stock, the labor force and the one-period debt
(net of cash). The model includes two sources of uncertainties: productivity shocks
(aggregate and idiosyncratic) and collateral shocks which affect the liquidity value of
capital.
3.4.1 Technology
The Cobb-Douglas production function where the firm uses capital K and labor input
N to produce output is given by:
Y pZt, Xt, Kt, Ntq  ZtXtpKαt N1αt qθ,
where α controls the relative share of two inputs and θ controls the degree of returns to
scale. With 0   θ   1, this production function displays decreasing returns to scale. Xt
is the aggregate state variable that summarizes the technology and consumer demand
conditions in the general economy (see, for example, Bertola 1998). Zt describes the
firm-specific productivity. Both Xt and Zt are informative about the financing demand
of the firm. The aggregate productivity and idiosyncratic productivity are independent
of each other and evolve according to the log AR(1) process
logpXt 1q  ρx logpXtq   σxεxt 1, logpZt 1q  ρz logpZtq   σzεzt 1,
in which εxt 1 (also εxt 1) are i.i.d. disturbance terms with standard normal distribution.
The AR coefficient ρx (ρz) denotes the persistence level of aggregate (firm-specific)
productivity. Denote the corporate tax rate as τ . The operating cash flow is
ΠpZt, Xt, Kt, Nt, swtq  p1  τq pY pZt, Xt, Kt, Ntq  swtNtq   δkτKt,
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where swt is the average wage rate, δk is the constant rate of capital depreciation and
δkτKt is the depreciation tax shield. The law of motion for the firm’s labor force Nt is
governed by
Nt 1  p1  δnqNt  Ht,
where δn is the quit rate and Ht denotes the gross hires, which is positive if the firm is
hiring and negative if the firm is firing. The firm bears the cost of hiring labor such as
the fees of advertising and posting vacancies, screening candidates and training staff.
The cost of labor adjustment, denoted by CpHtq, is
CpHtq  chHt1tHt¥0u,
where ch is the cost of hiring per worker. Although it is costless for the firms to
shed workers, the labor adjustment cost motivates the firm to hoard labor as it is
costly to reverse the decisions and hire them back. This creates a region of inaction
where firms choose not to hire or fire labor. Wage swt  w under the full wage rigidity
where the wage remains homogeneous for all workers in any periods of time (new
labor is being hired at the same wage as the current employees and the wage remains
constant indefinitely). The importance of wage rigidities is emphasized in a broad
set of literature. Stiglitz (1984) attempts to explain wage rigidities as a consequence
of implicit insurance provided to the risk-averse employees or a substitute for the
lower productivity brought by the lower wage. Empirically, Shimer (2004) shows that
the introduction of rigid wage accounts for the large fluctuations of employment and
vacancies (see also Pischke (2018), among others). Daly & Hobijn (2014) document
that the fraction of workers with no wage change increased substantially in 2011
relative to 2006 (see also Fallick et al. (2016), among others). I also look at the flexible
wage contract where firms can adjust wages for the new hires based on the spot market
rate and keep the same wages for incumbents for a certain period. I follow the wage
setting in Favilukis & Lin (2015). For the current employees, they face the probability
of 1  u to have their wages reset. In other words, I allow the firm to reset the wage




periods. In this way, the wage in each period will also depend
on the number of new employees endogenously chosen by the firm. The number of
incumbents is given by Inct  p1  δnqNt  Ht1tHt 0u and the number of new hires is
given by Ht1tHt¡0u. The average wage of the firm is a weighted average of the previous
average wage and the spot wage:
wt 1  p1  uqInctwt 1   uInct swt   wt 1Ht1tHt¡0u
Nt 1
.
This wage setting captures the important implications of Haefke et al. (2013) that
the wages of newly hired workers are more cyclical and more responsive to the labor
productivity. Similar to Belo et al. (2014), I assume that the spot wage is an increasing
function of the aggregate productivity and aggregate collateral value. It is given by
wt  κ0 exppκ1 logpXtq   κ2 logpStqq, (2.E.1)
where κ0 ¡ 0 and 0   κ1   1, 0   κ2   1. St denotes the value of collateral asset
which would be explained in details later. In this specification, κ1 and κ2 measure
the elasticity of wage to the aggregate productivity and the value of collateral asset.
0   κ1   1 and 0   κ2   1 capture the fact that wage, though cyclical, is less volatile
than the aggregate state variables.
The law of motion for the firm’s physical capital stock Kt is governed by
Kt 1  p1  δkqKt   It,
where δk is the depreciation rate and It is the gross investment, which is positive if the
firm is investing and negative if the firm is disinvesting. I normalize the price of buying
capital to 1. If the firm sells the used capital, it only recovers the price of ps   1.
The assumption that resale price of used capital is lower than purchase reflects the
frictions of capital investment due to the irreversibility. It creates the region of inaction
whereby the firm is cautious about making investment as the decision is difficult to
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be reversed. Also, capital investment incurs both convex and fixed adjustment costs.
Therefore, the total costs of capital adjustment are specified as






ps is the resale price of capital. ak is the parameter for fixed capital adjustment costs
to capture the notion of lumpy investment (Cooper & Haltiwanger 2006, Whited 2006).
I denote the parameter for convex adjustment costs as γ to account for the investment
smoothness. The indicator function 1tItp.q¥0u equals one if the firm is making positive
investment.
3.4.2 Financing
As in DeAngelo et al. (2011), the firm can finance its factor demand with internal
funds, one-period discount bond and external equity. Denote the stock of net debt as
Bt. Bt is allowed to take negative value, indicating cash holding. Also I include the
tax benefit of debt as the interest accrued to the debt is tax deductible, thus debt is
preferred to equity (pecking order theory). The interest payment of debt after tax is
rp1 τqBt. Unlike in Gamba & Triantis (2008), there is no debt issuance cost. Hence,
the firm never simultaneously hold cash and debt and any positive amount of cash
will be used to reduce debt outstanding before issuing the new one.
Due to the limited enforcement of contracts between lenders and firms, the firm faces
collateral constraints when borrowing. It requires that the promised debt payment
does not to exceed the liquidation value of the collateral, which is pledged by the firm
when issuing debt with tangible capital. The collateral constraint the firm faces is
Bt 1p1   rp1  τqq ¤ Stp1  δkqKt 1.
Recall that a negative value of Bt 1 represents a positive net cash position and a
positive value represents a positive net debt position. St denotes the value of collateral
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and it lies between 0 and 1. To explore the implications of collateral shocks, I let St
follow
logpSt 1q  µs   ρs logpStq   σsεst 1,
where µs determines the mean level of collateral value and the stochastic innovations
εst 1 denote collateral shocks which lead to unexpected changes to the collateral variable
St 1.
I define dividend to the equity holders as
et  ΠpZt, Xt, Kt, Nt, swtq GpIt, Ktq  CpHtq  Bt 1 Btp1   rp1  τqq.
If et ¡ 0, the firm is making dividend distributions to equity holder. If et   0,
the firm is issuing equity to cover the financing shortfall. Equity issuance incurs
security flotation costs and adverse selection costs due to asymmetric information
problems (Myers & Majluf 1984). I define the cost to external equity financing as a
linear-quadratic function (Riddick & Whited 2009):
ψpetq  pη0   η1et  η2
2
e2t q1tet 0u,
in which ηi ¡ 0, i  0, 1, 2. 1tet 0u is the indicator function which is equal to one
when the firm is issuing equity. The firm chooses pKt 1, Nt 1, Bt 1q each period to
maximize the expected discounted value of future cash flow given the current firm
capacity, financial position, productivity level and collateral value. Define the state
space vector as Ωt  pZt, Xt, St, Kt, Nt, Bt, swtq. The equity value satisfies the following
Bellman equation:
V pΩtq  max
Kt 1,Nt 1,Bt 1
tet   ψpetq   βEtrV pΩt 1qsu, (2.E.2)
where β  1{p1   rq is the discount factor and the expectation is taken by integrating
over the conditional distribution of St, Xt and Zt. The first two terms represent the




This subsection develops the optimality conditions for each of the firm’s choices. I
derive the optimal policy assuming that wage is constant and does not enter the state
space vector. Let λ  λt be the current-value Lagrange multiplier associated with the
collateral constraints. The first-order condition for investment policy (Kt 1) is: 7
GIpIt, Ktq
 
1   pη1  η2etq1tet 0u
  βEtrVKpΩt 1qs   λp1  δqSt. (2.E.3)
The left-hand side represents the cost of installing additional unit of capital. It
encompasses the cost of capital adjustment (real frictions) and cost of tapping equity
financing (financial frictions). The existence of financial costs temper the response of
investment to the shocks from economy. According to Hennessy & Whited (2005), the
envelope condition for VKpΩtq is VKpΩtq 
 p1 τqYKp.q   δkτ GKp.q   p1 δkqp1 
GIp.qq
 
1   pη1  η2etq1tet 0u

. The right-hand side is the marginal value for capital,
which includes collateral value of investment in relaxing the borrowing constraints.
The first-order condition with respect to labor choice (Nt 1) is:
CHpHtq
 
1   pη1  η2etq1tet 0u
  βEtrVNpΩt 1qs. (2.E.4)
Eqn (2.E.4) equates the marginal cost of expanding labor with the future net benefits
contributed by this unit of labor. Expanding or downsizing labor today requires
cost of labor adjustment as seen in CHpHtq. The envelope condition for VNpΩtq is
VNpΩtq 
 p1 τqYNp.q w  p1 δnqCHpHtq 1  pη1  η2etq1tet 0u. Lastly, I solve










Take first derivative with regard to Kt 1 (or It), one can arrive at (2.E.3).
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for the optimality condition for debt. The first derivative with respect to Bt 1 is:
1   pη1  η2etq1tet 0u  βEtrVBpΩt 1qs   λp1   rp1  τqq, (2.E.5)
where the envelope condition has that VBpΩtq  
 
1 rp1τq 1 pη1η2etq1tet 0u.8
The left-hand side captures the value of debt as financing with equity incurs costs.
The right-hand side represents the expected marginal cost of debt financing. The first
term on the right side is the costs of issuing debt as it incurs after-tax interest payment
next period, which is more costly if the firm has to issue equity to serve it. The second
term on the right-hand side represents the costs of debt stemming from the collateral
constraints. This term captures the opportunity cost of issuing debt today rather than
preserving debt capacity to issue tomorrow should better projects arise. It also creates
incentives for firms to hold cash or pay down debt to free up debt capacity for future
funding needs as equity financing entails costs (DeAngelo et al. 2011).
3.5 Model calibration and solution
The solution of the model must be obtained numerically. I first calibrate the model to
reproduce the moments on the firm-level data. And I examine the economics behind
the model by simulating the policy functions.
3.5.1 Calibration
The calibration of the model relies on parameter values used in related articles such
as Hennessy & Whited (2007), Gamba & Triantis (2008), Gilchrist et al. (2014) and
8With the envelop condition and the first-order condition for debt (2.E.5), I can derive the following
the shadow value of relaxing borrowing constraints
λt 
1
p1   rp1  τqq
pη1  η2etq1tet 0u  βEtrpη1  η2et 1q1tet 1 0us.
For simplicity, I ignore the script t for λ throughout the paper.
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Jermann & Quadrini (2012). In contrast to Gilchrist et al. (2014) and Jermann
& Quadrini (2012), my model solution is at the annual frequency rather than the
quarterly frequency. The quarterly frequency will dramatically lower the computation
speed. Based on Figure 3.1, the impact of the financial crisis has not receded even
over the horizon of ten years, therefore I opt for yearly frequency to accelerate the
convergence speed of the solution algorithm due to the multi-dimensionality. The
baseline parameters governing the process of individual productivity are similar to
those in Gamba & Triantis (2008), which is ρz  0.6, σz  0.15. The parameter set
for the aggregate productivity shock is yearly adjusted based on Jermann & Quadrini
(2012) and Gilchrist et al. (2014) such that ρx  0.8 and σx  0.04. The persistence
level ρs is set at 0.885, a value adjusted according to the estimates in Gilchrist et al.
(2014) using the price index of used car sales. This indicates a half-life of 5.7 years
and accords with the house price index and used vehicle sales index in U.S. published
by U.S. Federal Housing Finance Agency and U.S. Bureau of the Census, which shows
that it takes around nine years for the price indices to return to the pre-crisis level.
σs is set at 0.06, which is the average estimate of standard deviation in Jermann &
Quadrini (2012) and Gilchrist et al. (2014). µs  0.0797, which indicates that the
steady-state liquidation value of collateral is 0.5. It is chosen such that a steady-state
ratio of the book leverage is 50% (Gilchrist et al. 2014). The capital share αk is set
to be 0.36, the same as Belo et al. (2014). The returns to scale θ is set as 0.8. For
simplicity, I look at a more general tax scheme. The tax rate for debt interest payment
is τ  0.25, which is assumed to the tax rate on cash and on corporate earnings.
To set the parameters for capital adjustment and labor adjustment, I follow Michaels
et al. (2016) and Cooper & Haltiwanger (2006). The resale price of capital is lower
than its purchase price and is set at 0.7. The fixed cost of capital adjustment is
ak  0.04 based on the estimates in Cooper & Haltiwanger (2006). I set the parameter
γ to be 0.06, showing that one additional dollar of investment is associated with 0.009
dollar installation costs. The depreciation rate δk is set at 0.14 to replicate the mean
level of investment rate. As for the labor hiring costs, I take the values from Michaels
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et al. (2016) and set ch  0.08. The quit rate δn is set at 18% to match the monthly
quit rate of around 1.5% for manufacturing industries from BLS (Bureau of Labor
Statistics).
The parameter for the equity financing function is set according to the estimates in
Hennessy & Whited (2007). The fixed cost of issuing equity is set at η0  0.598. The
linear and quadratic cost parameters for equity issuance are set at η1  0.05 and
η2  0.0004. According to the underwriting fee scheme shown in Hennessy & Whited
(2007), the value set implies that the firm faces a proportional fee equal to 0.047 on
the first dollar of gross proceeds.
Appendix 3.A summarizes the calibrated parameters for the benchmark model. For
simplicity, I assume wage is constant when performing the model calibration. Table
3.2 presents firm-level moments from the actual data and moments computed from
the simulated data of the model. The details of data construction are presented in
Appendix 3.B.
The value function V pΩtq and the optimal policy function are solved using value function
iteration method. To smooth the results, multidimensional linear interpolation is used
extensively in solving for the policy function and value function. After I solve the
model, I begin to simulate an artificial cross-section of 2000 firms with 150 model
periods. The simulation begins by taking one random path for Xt and St and 2000
random paths for Zt. I remove the first 120 periods to eliminate the impact of initial
suboptimal conditions. The simulation procedure is repeated 500 times.
3.5.2 Simulated policy functions
Using the calibrated parameters, I evaluate the key choice variables in the model
by presenting the policy functions in Figure 3.2. The solid (dashed) line in the left
panel plots the investment rate (defined as It{Kt), employment growth (defined as
Ht{Nt) and net debt issuance rate (defined as Bt 1  p1   rqBt{Kt) in response to
the aggregate productivity level Xt when St is fixed at intermediate state (low state).
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Table 3.2: Target moments
This table summarizes the empirical and model-implied firm-level moments calculated on
an annual basis. The accounting data is drawn from a sample of non-financial, non-utility
and unregulated firms in Compustat industry annual file between 1990 and 2006. While
employment size is drawn from Compustat, wage data comes from Quarterly Workforce
Indicators (QWI) of the Longitudinal Employer-Household Dynamics (LEHD) program at
the U.S. Census Bureau. QWI data is merged with Compustat based on their 4-digit NAICS
industry code, the state of headquarters and the size of employment. Investment spike is
defined if the investment rate is 2 times greater than its mean.
Moment Data Model
Investment rate 0.144 0.149
Std. dev. of investment rate 0.144 0.138
Frac. of investment spikes 0.114 0.131
Serial Corr. of investment rate 0.580 0.660
Employment growth 0.031 0.046
Std. dev. of employment growth 0.233 0.319
Wage bills/asset ratio 0.318 0.304
Dividend/asset ratio 0.010 0.029
Income/asset ratio 0.112 0.179
Std. dev. of income/asset ratio 0.164 0.083
Serial Corr. of income/asset ratio 0.798 0.523
Market-to-book ratio 2.242 2.312
Frac. of negative dividends 0.532 0.522
Equity issuance/asset 0.044 0.060
Frac. of negative debt 0.323 0.333
Debt issuance/asset 0.0077 0.0077
The solid (dashed) line in the right panel plots the choice variables in response to
the collateral level St when productivity Xt is fixed at intermediate state (low state).
Investment rate and employment growth initially rises steeply with Xt but then flattens
out. The constraints on the borrowing imposed by the limited value of St causes
the stagnation. Net debt issuance summarizes the behavior of saving (negative value)
and borrowing from lenders (positive value). With low level of aggregate productivity,
firms save but the saving decreases with Xt initially as liquid assets are shifted to more
8Due to some statistical error, the investment rate at high Xt for the medium collateral state is
slightly lower than that for the low collateral state. Also the low collateral state might lead to lower
Kt, which results in a higher It{Kt.
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productive uses should productivity rise due to the mean-reverting nature of the shock
(see Riddick & Whited (2009) for the explanation of the substitution effect). The
saving starts to rise with the aggregate productivity under a slightly higher level of Xt
due to the income effect generated by Xt. With high level of aggregate productivity,
firms increase their borrowing with the productivity Xt initially. Then the increase
in borrowing is bounded by the collateral constraints and firms even reduce the debt
outstanding with sufficient internally-generated funds brought by the high productivity
level (income effect). The response does not change by much even if the collateral
value is low.
With regard to the response to the collateral value, both real variables and financial
variables rise slowly but monotonically with St when the productivity level is interme-
diate. Nonetheless, the low level of productivity generates a modest response to St for
all variables. Fluctuations in credit supply have an impact on firms’ policy only when
firms have sufficient financing demands (i.e., productivity level is sufficiently high).
The corresponding response of investment rate and employment growth underlines
the importance of the collateral-driven credit channel in explaining the change of real
policies and how the credit channel interacts with the demand (productivity) channel.
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Figure 3.2: Simulated policy functions
The solid line (dashed line) of left panel in Figure 3.2 plots the response of investment,
employment growth and debt issuance (net of cash) to the aggregate productivity (Xt) when
St is kept at median (low) level. The solid line (dashed line) of right panel in Figure 3.2
plots the response of investment, employment growth and debt issuance (net of cash) to the
aggregate collateral variable (St) when Xt is kept at median (low) level.
3.6 Implications of aggregate shocks
In this section, I assess the firms’ policies in response to the aggregate productivity
and collateral shocks. In each simulation, a negative collateral (productivity) shock
hits in period 0 and leads to a drop in collateral value (aggregate productivity). I
intend to study the key choice variables and firm value in response to the negative
shocks. I compute the model-implied impulse response functions and plot the value of
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investment, capital stock, employment stock, output level, net debt and firm value
upon the impact. In this section, I focus on the case where the wage is fully rigid.
Figure 3.3 shows how the firms’ policies respond to the shocks to the aggregate
collateral value. The solid line describes the response to a single shock in collateral
variable St when the aggregate productivity variable Xt is fixed at its intermediate level.
A shock to the collateral value leads to 16% decline in St (1.5 standard deviation),
which mimics the deepest percentage decline in the house price during the financial
crisis. I assume that the wage is rigid and insensitive to the aggregate state variables
(κ2  κ1  0) in this case. Upon the impact of the collateral shock, investment
plunges sharply by more than 15%, in line with the sharp decrease observed for the
business investment at the onset of the financial crisis. The adverse collateral shock
results in a large and persistent deterioration in the output level, capital stock and
employment. The output, capital stock, and employment gradually decline and the
resulting recovery is slow and remain below the pre-crisis level for a prolonged period.
The effect on the financial leverage is translated into 60% drop in the net borrowing
and stays below the pre-shock level over the response period. The total firm value
continues to fall upon the impact and the following pick-up is subdued.
The dotted line in Figure 3.3 illustrates the response to the collateral shock when the
economy is struck by an adverse productivity shock as well. To isolate the impact of
collateral shock, I first model the responses when both shocks hit and then take the
difference in responses between the twin shocks and the single productivity shock. For
instance, investment rate drops by 60% when both negative shocks strick the economy
and by 50% when a single adverse productivity shock hits. One can only ascribe
10% of the decline in the investment rate to the impact from the collateral sector. It
shows that when the productivity is depressed during the financial crisis, the firms
have less financing needs and the influence of negative collateral shock on real and
financial variables will be less pronounced. The muted response to the collateral shock
translates into a slight drop in firm value and a rapid and full recovery thereafter.
This result stresses a important interaction between the shock from credit demand and
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Figure 3.3: Response to the collateral shock
Note: Figure 3.3 describes the impulse response functions for investment, output level,
capital stock, employment, net debt and firm value. A shock reduces the collateral value by
1.5 standard deviation upon the impact. The solid line depicts the movement of variables in
response to the collateral shock when aggregate productivity is fixed at the median level.
The dotted line describes the effect of the collateral shock when both shocks hit by taking
the difference in response between the twin shocks and the single productivity shock. The
collateral value is allowed to revert to the long-run level after the shock. The y-axes depict
the percentage change (difference in percentage change for the dotted line) from the pre-shock
level.
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Figure 3.4: Response to the aggregate productivity shock
Note: Figure 3.4 describes the impulse response functions for investment, output level, capital
stock, employment, net debt and firm value. In both lines, a shock reduces the aggregate
productivity by 1.0 standard deviation upon the impact and collateral variable is fixed at
the long-run mean level. Solid line depicts the case with collateral constraints (with CC)
and dashed line depicts the situation without collateral constraints (w/o CC). The aggregate
productivity is allowed to revert to the long-run level after the shock. The y-axes depict
percentage change from the pre-shock level.
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credit supply. The credit supply shock exerts a significant impact on the firm’s real
and financial policies only when productivity or demand remains at the steady state
(as compared to a dip in productivity since the crisis). This finding represents the
challenge researchers face in identifying and isolating the impact of credit supply shock
from its demand effect. The impact of supply shock subsides when the demand-side
effect of the crisis dominates during economic downturns. In this case, any destruction
to the firms’ activities during the downturns can not be purely ascribed to the shocks
from the supply side. Therefore, the crisis episode used to identify the impact of the
credit supply shock must not coincide with the weakening of business conditions. The
firms’ long-run behavior when hit by the aggregate productivity shock is shown in the
solid line of Figure 3.4. A shock to the aggregate productivity (St is kept at its median)
corresponds to 6% drop in Xt, which replicates the percentage drop in GDP during
the crisis. It induces a substantial drop in all of the economic variables in response to
the decline in credit demand. Investment and output gradually bounce back to full
capacity over the response period. After the initial drop, firm value steadily improves
over time, contrasting the slow growth of firm value displayed when collateral shock
hits. The dashed line describes the situation when the firm is not bounded by the
collateral constraints. When the collateral constraints do not exist, the firm would
increase the debt capacity to the largest possible level to take advantage of tax benefits.
Sharp decline is still observed for the real variables, but the magnitude is smaller and
non-binding constraints allow the firm to revert to the pre-shock level at a slightly
faster pace.
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3.7 Comparative statics: financial frictions and la-
bor market frictions
This section presents the comparative static results that demonstrate how firms’
behavior changes with the nature of frictions of equity financing and labor market
when impacted by a shock. Figure 3.5 compares firms with high equity financing costs
(constrained) with firms that face zero equity financing costs (unconstrained). I define
constrained firms as the firms which face twice the benchmark parameter values in
terms of linear and quadratic equity financing costs. The solid line depicts the response
of variables to the shock when there are no equity issuance costs (unconstrained)
and the dotted line describes the response of variables to the shock when the equity
financing is costly (constrained). It plots the evolution of net debt issuance, net equity
issuance, investment with an adverse productivity shock (Figure 3.5a) or an adverse
collateral shock (Figure 3.5b). The investment of an unconstrained firm (a firm with
zero equity financing costs) is better safeguarded against the impact of collateral shock
and recovers at a higher speed. The shock to aggregate productivity translates into a
larger decline in investment but a stronger recovery in the financially unconstrained
scenario. The unconstrained access to equity financing allows firms to accommodate
their investment in response to emerging business opportunities more flexibly. When
the firms are burdened with high equity financing costs, investment falls less steeply
with the productivity shock. Constrained firms anticipate high equity issuance costs
associated with a strong funding need in the future to scale back investment when
the productivity rises (mean-reverting nature). As it is costly to reverse investment
decisions due to the presence of external financing costs, constrained firms would
cut down on investment less aggressively. This is in line with Hennessy & Whited
(2007), who show that the presence of costly external finance dampen the response of
investment to the productivity. Net debt issuance collapses when either shock strikes,
which corresponds to the procyclicality of debt financing evidenced in the economic
literature (Covas & Den Haan 2011, Jermann & Quadrini 2012). Constrained firms cut
78
Figure 3.5: Comparative statics of financial frictions on the response to the shocks
(a) Response to the productivity shock (b) Response to the collateral shock
Note: Figure 3.5 describes the impulse response functions for net debt issuance, net equity
issuance and investment, all scaled by capital stock. The solid line depicts the response of
variables to the shock when there are no equity issuance costs. The dotted line describes the
response of variables to the shock when the equity financing is costly. A shock reduces the
collateral value (aggregate productivity) by 1.5 (1.0) standard deviation upon impact. The
collateral value (aggregate productivity) is allowed to revert to the long-run level after the
shock.
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debt issuance less significantly as it may incur higher costs of equity issuance to build
up leverage for tax benefits in the future. The cyclical nature of equity issuance depends
on the types of shocks and the financial status of firms. The negative productivity
shock causes the equity issuance to fall (i.e., procyclical) while the negative collateral
shock causes the equity issuance to rise (countercyclical) initially. The productivity
shock case, as shown in Figure 3.5a, reveals that equity issuance decreases in response
to the diminished demand for financial funds. But the response is modest for financially
constrained firms with their equity issuance suppressed. Also the constrained firms
would save rather than pay dividends (negative equity issuance) to avoid the potential
costly equity issuance. The collateral shock case shows that firms substitute debt
financing for equity issuance when the negative shock to the collateral value curtails
the borrowing capacity. Such substitution effect and thus the countercyclical nature of
equity issuance with respect to the collateral shock are amplified for firms that have
an easier access to the equity financing market. Covas & Den Haan (2011) argue that
the cyclicality of equity issuance depends on firm sizes and only large firms display
countercyclical equity issuing behavior. I show that firms with lower equity financing
costs are in a better position to offset the negative impact on the debt capacity during
the worsening of credit conditions by selling equity.
According to the labor hoarding concept (Biddle 2014), costs from adjusting labor
input, e.g., transaction costs of new hiring, training costs, acquiring skills, prevent firms
from optimizing their employment behavior flexibly and instantaneously. Also, firms
operating in industries with powerful labor unions have less flexility to fire workers and
hire workers with caution as it is difficult to unwind such a decision (Chen et al. 2011).
Hence, adjusting wages while retaining the working force during economic contractions
would allow firms to recover faster when business revives. On the other hand, firms
may face difficulties in adjusting wages and the resulting optimization strategies lead
to laying off workers, which makes wage rigidities become a well-documented driving
force for high unemployment rates and large employment fluctuations (see, e.g., Hall
2005, Mian & Sufi 2014, Pischke 2018). To examine these two sources of labor rigidities,
80
Figure 3.6 demonstrates the relative value of wage flexibility and relative value of
costless labor adjustment (contractual term flexibility) for both large firms and small
firms. The relative firm value is computed as firm value in the flexible case scaled by the
firm value in the benchmark case. The relative value of net debt issuance, investment
and employment growth are computed as the difference in value between the flexible
case and the benchmark case.9 The firms that have costless labor adjustment (ch  0)
can embrace the flexibility of hiring and also shedding workers. I sort the firms based
on their capital stock (Kt) one period before the shock. Small (large) firms are the
firms that are in the bottom (top) 30% of the distribution of capital stock in that
period. In the wage contract setting shown in Eqn (2.E.1), κ2 controls the elasticity of
wage to the aggregate collateral variable and is set at 0.1. κ1 controls the elasticity of
wage to the aggregate productivity and is set at 0.3. It indicates that a negative shock
to the collateral value or to the productivity is associated with around 1.7% drop in
the spot wage rate wt. The wage for the newly hired workers is set according to the
spot wage rate and the wage for the incumbents is adjusted with the probability of
1  u. u is set at 0.6 in the analyses, indicating that the current employees will have
their wage changed every 2.5 periods. The marked solid (marked dashed-dotted) line
in Figure 3.6 plots the total value, net debt issuance, investment and employment
growth of small (large) firms under flexible wage contract relative to the rigid wage
contract case. The dashed (dotted) line in Figure 3.6 plots the total value, net debt
issuance, investment and employment growth of small (large) firm under zero labor
adjustment costs relative to the costly labor adjustment (flexible connatural terms)
case.





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Several features stand out from Figure 3.6. Firstly, costless labor adjustment is far
more important for small firms than for large ones. Note that an initial upward
(downward) trend of relative value indicates that the value in the flexible case drops by
less (more) upon the negative impact and the subsequent upward (downward) trend
indicates that the value recovers faster (slower) when the condition reverts. As shown
in the top left graph in Figure 3.6a and Figure 3.6b, the relative firm value under
costless labor adjustment increases steadily for small firms within the 5-year horizon
after the impact of either shock, which implies that the total firm value of small firms
with zero labor adjustment frictions drop by less initially when negative shocks hit and
revives to the trend level at a higher pace. The relative level of net borrowing with
zero labor adjustment costs rises for small firms while decreases for large firms upon
the impact of negative collateral shock, which implies that net borrowing of small firms
decreases less dramatically if the labor adjustment costs are lowered. Cross-sectionally,
for the most part, the dashed line stays above solid line for investment and employment
growth, meaning that the additional level of investment and hiring brought by a flexible
labor contractual term is higher for small firms than for large firms. Small firms are
more likely to engage in active hirings to expand their business, therefore the value of
lowering labor adjustment costs is manifested more for small firms than for large firms
in handling the adverse shocks.
Secondly, firms with costless labor adjustment cut their investment and employment
activities by less following a collateral shock, however, they reduce their investment
and employment activity to a greater extent when productivity shock hits. As shown
in the bottom graph in Figure 3.6b, the relative value measured in terms of investment
and employment growth 10 brought by the costless labor adjustment rises initially upon
the impact of collateral shock, indicating that firms will cut down on their investment
and hiring activity less aggressively if they bear no labor adjustment costs. After
the firms’ financial conditions are worsened by the collateral shock, firms with costly
10Recall that the relative value in this case is calculated as the difference in investment (employment
growth) between firms with costless labor adjustment and firms with costly labor adjustment costs.
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labor adjustment see a larger decline in employment growth as replacing the workers
who quit incurs costs and is constrained by the availability of financing. If the labor
adjustment costs are trimmed, firms are able and willing to replenish the labor force
as the productivity and labor demand remain robust. Nonetheless, as shown in the
bottom graph in Figure 3.6a, the relative value of costless labor adjustment measured
in terms of investment and employment growth falls upon the impact of productivity
shock, indicating that firms cut their investment and employment activities more
significantly. In this case, firms choose to fire workers or cut hiring and slash their
investment as a response to a depressed business demand, and they are more able
to do so with lower labor adjustment costs as they know that they can unwind the
decision easily when business demand bounces back.
Thirdly, flexible wage contract alleviates the short-run negative impact of both shocks
and allows both firm value and the level of real activity to deteriorate on a smaller
scale than in the case of their rigid wage, regardless of the firm size.11 For a better
clarification, I provide the impulse response functions with regard to different level of
wage flexibility in Figure 3.7. The initial mitigation brought by the flexible wage to
the firms’ investment and employment policy is more pronounced with the shock from
the collateral sector. The alleviation from flexible wage being less apparent for firms
suffering from a productivity shock shows that it is optimal for firms to scale down
their economic activities facing a productivity slowdown, even at a lower wage rate.
The difference between flexible wage and rigid wage case narrows down through time
when Xt (St) is returning to its long-run level. It means the firms with flexible wage
will curtail their investment and shed their workers less dramatically and also see their
firm value fall by a lower extent. However, the value of flexible wage diminishes over
time as the wage starts to rise with the recuperating economy.
11Though the changes in wage should exhibit a higher impact on firms that have large employment
size (large firms), I find that the wage is more rigid for large firms than it is for small firms as large
firms are less likely to involve themselves in new hiring.
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Figure 3.7: Response to the shocks with different wage settings
(a) Response to the productivity shock (b) Response to the collateral shock
Note: Figure 3.7 describes the impulse response functions for firm value, net borrowing,
investment and employment growth. The solid line describes the situation where the wage is
the same for all employees (incumbents and new hires) in any periods of time. The dashed
line and the dotted line describes the situation where wage for the new hires is set at the
spot wage rate. The level of wage flexibility is modulated by u. u  0.9 (u  0.3) indicates
that the wage for the incumbents can be reset at the probability of 0.1 (0.7).
3.8 Conclusions
The 2007-09 financial panic was accompanied by a steep and protracted slump in
house value and economic activities. It arguable provides an episode for researchers to
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assess the long-run effect of a credit supply shock. However, it poses a challenge as
the credit crunch is followed by the worsening of business demand. I build a structural
model in which the productivity (demand) shock and credit supply (collateral) shock is
modeled as two independent random processes. Also, I examine whether the responses
to the shocks depends on the types of shocks and the status of firms.
I find that a negative shock to the collateral value, which results in tightening the credit
constraints, can lead to a protracted recession and subdued recovery with real business
conditions (aggregate productivity) unchanged. Nonetheless, the impact of credit
supply shock subsides when the demand-side takes effect - a slump in the productivity.
The importance of cutting labor adjustment costs is manifested more in small firms
than in large ones. The reduction of labor adjustment costs causes investment and
employment growth to fall more dramatically with the negative productivity shock
but decline less significantly with the negative collateral shock. The negative outcomes
from the collateral shock are substantially tempered for firms that sign a flexible
wage contract. As a matter of financial decisions, I find that equity issuance is
procyclical with the productivity shock and countercyclical with the collateral shock.
The cyclicality of equity financing is less pronounced for financially constrained firms.
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Appendix 3.A. Benchmark parameters
The parameter values used in the calibration of the benchmark model are presented in
Table 3.A.1.
Table 3.A.1: Key calibrated parameters
Parameters Value
Technology: Production
Returns to scale (θ) 0.8
Share of capital in the production function (α) 0.36
Rate of depreciation (δk) 0.14
Quit rate of labor (δn) 0.18
Technology: Adjustment costs
Resale price of capital (ps) 0.7
Convex parameter in capital adjustment costs (γ) 0.06
Fixed parameter in capital adjustment costs (ak) 0.04
Hiring cost per capita (ch) 0.08
Financial functions
Fixed cost of equity financing (η0)) 0.598
Linear cost of equity financing (η1) 0.05
Quadratic cost of equity financing (η2) 0.0004
Stochastic process
Persistence of the idiosyncratic productivity process (ρz) 0.6
Volatility of the idiosyncratic productivity process (σz) 0.15
Persistence of the aggregate productivity process (ρx) 0.8
Volatility of the aggregate productivity process (σx) 0.04
Persistence of the collateral value (ρs) 0.885
Volatility of the collateral value (σs) 0.06
Steady-state collateral value (µs) -0.0797
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Appendix 3.B. Data variables
In this appendix, I provide some details regarding the calculations of the target
moments. The sample is extracted from Compustat industry annual file incorporated
in the U.S. between 1990 and 2006. I discard the financial firms (SIC between 6000
and 6999), utility firms (SIC between 4900 and 4999) and government services (SIC
between 9000 and 9999). Inside the parenthesis, I write data name in Compustat
industry annual file. Investment is measured as capital expenditure (capx ). Capital
stock is defined as gross property, plant and equipment (ppegt). Investment rate is
constructed as capital expenditure scaled by capital stock. Investment spike is defined
if the investment rate is 2 times greater than its mean. Market-to-book of ratio is
defined as market value of asset (the market value of asset is market value of common
stock (prcc_fcsho) plus total asset (at) minus total common equity (ceq) minus
deferred taxes (txdb)) divided by total value of book asset (at). Employment growth
is defined as the percentage change in the number of staff (emp). Dividend is the sum
of common dividend and preferred dividend. Income is defined as operating income
before depreciation (oibdp). Total debt is long-term debt (dltt) plus debt in current
liabilities (dlc). Net debt is total debt net of cash (che). Equity issuance is the sale of
common and preferred stock (sstk). I also delete the firms that have sales or asset
growth exceeding 100% to eliminate the effect of business discontinuities. I drop the
observations with sales or capital stock less than 1 million USD to eliminate the effect
of outliers. I winsorize all relevant variables at 1% in each year. Wage data comes
from Quarterly Workforce Indicators (QWI) of the Longitudinal Employer-Household
Dynamics (LEHD) program at the U.S. Census Bureau. I obtain the average earnings
of employees with stable jobs who work for the private non-farm companies. QWI
data is then merged with Compustat based on their 4-digit NAICS industry code,
the state of headquarters and the size of employment. Wage bills is labor earnings
multiplied by employment.
Chapter 4
Revisiting the measurement error in q:
An investigation of the covariance among
regressors
4.1 Introduction
Tobin’s q and cash flow are the common explanatory variables in empirical corporate
finance research to study how investment or other variables of interest responds to the
growth opportunities and the internal financial resources. There is a large body of
empirical literature that places Tobin’s q and cash flow on the right-hand side when
performing the OLS regressions. Fazzari, Hubbard & Petersen (1988) have examined
the effect of internal funds on investment by linearly regressing investment on Tobin’s
q and cash flow (see also, e.g., Rauh 2006, Lamont 1997). Following Fazzari, Hubbard
& Petersen (1988), investment-cash flow sensitivity has been employed to gauge the
degree of financial constraints (Goyal & Yamada 2004, Erel et al. 2015), to examine
the role of stock market valuations in determining investment spending (Blanchard
et al. 1993, Campello & Graham 2013), to investigate the impact of labor frictions on
corporate behavior (Chen & Chen 2013, Benmelech et al. 2011) and to analyze the
effect of managerial characteristic (Bertrand & Schoar 2003, Malmendier & Tate 2005)
and ownership structure (Hadlock 1998, Pindado et al. 2011) on corporate decision
making. More importantly, a number of studies attempt to challenge the positive and
even monotonic relationship between financing constraints and investment-cash flow
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sensitivity (Kaplan & Zingales 1997, Cleary 1999, Gomes 2001, Chen & Chen 2012).
Moreover, papers that study a firm’s saving behavior also draw conclusions based on
regressions with Tobin’s q and cash flow (Almeida et al. 2004, Bates et al. 2009). This
poses a challenge as empirical Tobin’s q is measured with error and researchers are
struggling to come up with a better empirical proxy.
Despite the measurement error in the empirical q variable, OLS regressions with q and
cash flow as the right-hand-side variables are prevalent in the realm of corporate finance.
Among the empirical research that employs both Tobin’s q and cash flow as regressors,
several major findings stand out. Chen & Chen (2012) find that investment-cash flow
sensitivity decreases over time and disappears in the late 2000s (Brown & Petersen
2009, Moshirian et al. 2017). Cross-sectionally, Hadlock & Pierce (2010) suggest that
more financially-constrained firms as indicated by having high WW index, KZ index
and HP index can have lower investment-cash flow sensitivity. However, a fundamental
concern in the OLS regressions arises due to the measurement error contained in the
observed empirical Tobin’s average q (mismeasured variable). The measurement error
leads to inconsistent estimates on other correlated variables such as cash flow and any
inference drawn from the biased estimates is potentially incorrect. Concerns about
biases resulting from measurement error are discussed in Erickson & Whited (2000,
EW hereafter). EW (2000) argue that the observed positive investment-cash flow
sensitivity may be spurious as the measurement error in empirical q biases cash flow
coefficient estimates upward from its theoretical prediction of zero derived based on
the first order conditions in Lucas & Prescott (1971) and Mussa (1977).
We find, via the classical errors-in-variables model, that the sign of covariance between q
(mismeasured variable) and cash flow (perfectly-measured variable) plays an important
role in shaping the way measurement error affects the estimates of cash flow coefficients
in an OLS regression. We show that both cash flow sensitivity of investment and cash
flow sensitivity of cash demonstrate a declining pattern over time (See also Chapter 2 of
this thesis). Based on the errors-in-variables model, the measurement error in q biases
the OLS estimates of cash flow upward only if q and cash flow have a significant positive
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covariance, denoted as φQcf ¡ 0. As the variance-covariance structure between cash
flow and q varies over time, this variation may offer an explanation for the discrepancies
of cash flow sensitivity in different periods. We discover that the φQcf in the late
periods are negative or non-significantly positive. The negative correlation between
cash flow and investment opportunities as proxied by Tobin’s q can emerge due to the
coexistence of low cash flow state and low price of capital goods, which is translated
into good investment opportunities (Rampini & Viswanathan 2010), a positive shock
on adjustment technology followed by a negative shock on output, and an adverse
transitory shock to the cash flow with the prospect of future profitability staying
robust (Decamps, Gryglewicz, Morellec & Villeneuve 2016). The small magnitude of
φQcf would mitigate the upward bias in the estimated cash flow coefficient and the
negative φQcf would induce a downward bias on the estimated cash flow coefficient.
The negative or non-significant covariance between q and cash flow in recent years
therefore accounts for the low values of cash flow sensitivity estimated in late periods.
Furthermore, the covariance structures also help to explain the perceived differential
cash flow sensitivity between constrained and unconstrained subsamples of firms
classified using an indirect proxy for constraints. The widely used constraint measures
are WW-index (Whited & Wu 2006), KZ-index (Lamont et al. 2001), HP-index
(Hadlock & Pierce 2010), bond-ratings and dividend ratios. The estimated cash flow
sensitivity for the constrained firms tends to display lower (“wrong-way”) values, which
casts doubt on the ability of investment-cash flow sensitivity to capture the firms’
financial status (see Kaplan & Zingales 1997, Erickson & Whited 2000, Hadlock &
Pierce 2010). However, we discover that constrained firms that have high WW-index,
KZ-index, HP-index and no bond-ratings have a negative or a lower φQcf , which is
associated with downward biased estimates of cash flow coefficient. As cash flow
coefficients are underestimated for constrained subsamples of firms, they may explain
the reversed relationship between the observed investment-cash flow sensitivity and the
magnitude of financial constraints. Therefore, our analysis re-examines the argument
that a low estimated investment-cash flow sensitivity for constrained firms represents
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its incapacity to measure the degree of financial constraints.
It is worth noting that although the measurement error in q plays a significant role in
shaping the time-series and the cross-section of cash flow sensitivity; we would not
postulate that this effect alone can fully account for the observed patterns of cash flow
sensitivity. In this chapter, we provide explore one channel, the variance-covariance
structure between cash flow and q, but other factors such as capital and labor market
frictions are also deemed important in explaining the patterns of cash flow sensitivity.
In order to tackle the issue of measurement error, EW (2000, 2002) have suggested
using a high-order moment-based GMM estimator (EW estimator). We show that EW
estimator generates a bias in the coefficient of mismeasured variables (attenuation bias)
if the assumptions adopted in the classical errors-in-variables model do not hold. The
attenuation bias from the mismeaured variable still affects the coefficients on the other
variables via the covariance-variance channel. We design a Monte Carlo experiment in
which the classical assumptions are relaxed. In particular, we test the performance of
OLS estimator and EW estimator when the error is non-classical, i.e., when the true
latent variable is correlated with the measurement error. The simulation under the
non-classical error allows the measurement error in the empirical proxy to correlate
with the true variable and it results in biased estimates even for the EW estimator. It
shows that even though EW estimator can handle the errors-in-variables under the
classical assumption, it produces biases in the presence of a non-classical error. Again,
the bias in q coefficient produces a downward biased estimate for cash flow sensitivity
when there is a negative correlation between q and cash flow under the non-classical
assumption as well.
This chapter fits into two strands of literatures in corporate finance and economics.
First, it is related to works which attempt to examine the cross-sectional and time-
series patterns of cash flow sensitivity (Ağca & Mozumdar 2017, Chen & Chen 2012,
Hadlock & Pierce 2010, among many others). This chapter, however, provides an
alternative perspective by examining the pattern of covariance between cash flow and
q. In particular, we find that the negative or the small positive covariance between
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q and cash flow contributes to the low cash flow sensitivity estimated in the late
periods and in the constrained samples of firms. To our best knowledge, this is the first
paper to employ evidence from the covariance between q and cash flow to explain the
patterns of cash flow sensitivity. Second, it adds to the studies concerning the impact
of measurement error in variables. Prior literature has examined a number of ways to
deal with measurement error.1 The most widely used one is EW estimator. Notably,
EW (2000, 2002) assert that cash flow sensitivity should disappear once EW estimator
is applied to address the measurement-error bias. It falls short, however, as it relies
on the classical assumption of measurement error. We show that the attenuation
bias is still present and inflicts the estimated coefficients on cash flow when the error
is non-classical. In this sense, this chapter is linked to literature that examines the
consequences of non-classical measurement error (e.g., O’Neill & Sweetman 2013,
Gottschalk & Huynh 2010).
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 4.2 introduces the
theory of classical and non-classical measurement error. Section 4.3 describes data
source, data variables and present some summary statistics. Section 4.4 presents
the time-series regression analysis. Section 4.5 outlines the cross-sectional regression
output. Section 4.6 conducts Monte Carlo simulation experiments and discusses the
impact of measurement error in the presence of a non-classical error. Section 4.7 makes
conclusions.
1EW (2000, 2002) have suggested applying the high-order moment-based GMM estimator (EW
estimator) to purge the measurement error. Almeida et al. (2010) maintain that EW estimator
performs badly in case of heterogeneity and low skewness of data and recommend using instrumental
variables-type estimator (see also Ağca & Mozumdar 2017). EW (2012), in response, argue that the
poor performance is due to the misuse of starting values and EW estimator outperforms IV estimator
when measurement error is serially correlated.
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4.2 The theory of measurement error
4.2.1 Classical measurement error theory
According to EW (2000), positive cash flow coefficients can arise from the measurement
error in empirical average q. The EW (2000) measurement-error-corrected estimates,
which are attained by minimizing the high-order moment equations, are sensitive to
the change of starting values (Erickson & Whited 2012) and can only be recovered
when the data displays high degree of skewness (Almeida et al. 2010). In this section,
we decide to review the impact of measurement error by resorting to the classical
measurement error theory. We follow EW (2000) and use their notation to present the
cross-sectional estimates. According to the q-investment theory, investment-to-capital
ratio is explained by investment opportunities, which is defined as marginal q. The
empirical equation with true marginal q is
yi  χiβ   ziB  ui, (4.2.1)
where yi is a scalar representing investment scaled by book value of capital, χi is the
unobservable true marginal q. zi  pci 1...q is a 1K row vector for perfectly-measured
variables which contain cash flow variable ci, 1 for constant term and other relevant
control variables. B  pα γ0...q1 is a K  1 vector where the first element , denoted by
α, is the coefficient on cash flow. Marginal q is not observed, hence empirically one
uses average q to measure marginal q. The observable empirical q is measured as
xi  χi   ei, (4.2.2)
where ei is the measurement error. Classical measurement error theory assumes
that i) ui is a regression error independent of pχi, xiq; ii) ei is a mean zero error
independent of pχi, zi, uiq; iii) pui, ei, χi, xiq are independent and identically distributed
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(i.i.d). Substituting (4.2.2) into (4.2.1), one can obtain
yi  xiβ   ziB  pui  eiβq, (4.2.3)
where the error term in the new regression pui  eiβq is correlated with xi since
Covpei, xiq  0. Hence orthogonality condition fails to stand and it results in inconsis-
tent estimation for the coefficients in xi and zi. As in EW (2000), we partial out the
effect of perfectly-measured variables zi.2 For simplicity, we drop the script i. One can
rewrite the expression Eqn (4.2.1) and Eqn (4.2.2) in terms of population residuals:
9y  9χβ   u, (4.2.4)
9x  9χ  e. (4.2.5)
p 9y, 9x, 9χq are the residuals of regressing py, x, χq on z. The probability limit of the OLS
coefficient on the mismeasured variable is3




where Varpχ|zq  Varp 9χq is the error variance from regressing χ on z. Denote
λ  1
1 Varpeq{Varpχ|zq as the measure of the reliability of the data. λ  1 if Varpeq  0
and λ reflects the measurement quality of the empirical q variable. Since 0   λ   1, βˆ1 is
always biased downward. The bias is called attenuation bias. Higher measurement error
variance relative to the error variance (Varpeq{Varpχ|zq) results in higher attenuation
bias in q coefficient.
Denote φyc (φxc) as the coefficient on c in a linear projection of y (x) on z. Assume
2Applying Frisch-Waugh-Lovell (FWL) theorem, one can partial out the perfectly-measured




ipyi, xi, χiqq. Multiplying Eqn (4.2.1), Eqn (4.2.2)
by z
1
i, taking expectation and then multiplying by rEpz
1
iziqs1, Eqn (4.2.1), Eqn (4.2.2) become
φyz  φχzβ   B, φxz  φχx. Multiplying by zi, we have ziφyz  ziφχzβ   ziB, ziφxz  ziφχz.
Subtracting from Eqn (4.2.1), Eqn (4.2.2) yields 9yi  9χiβ   ui, 9xi  9χi   ei where p 9yi, 9xi, 9χiq are









that x and c are our main regressors in the bivariate regression. The probability limit
of the cash flow coefficient is 4
plimpαˆOLSq  φyc  φxcplimpβˆOLSq. (4.2.7)
α  φyc  φχcβ if no variable is mismeasured. φχc  φxc as e is independent of c. One
can write
plimpαˆOLSq  α  φxcpplimpβˆOLSq  βq. (4.2.8)
We have shown in (4.2.7) that measurement error always biases the OLS estimate of β
downward. However, the direction in which measurement error biases the estimate of
cash flow coefficient will depend on φxc, which is the linear coefficient of regressing x
on c after controlling for all other variables in z or, the covariance between x and c
scaled by variance of c, denoted as Covpx,cq
Varpcq
, in the bivariate regression. (For simplicity,
we now focus on the bivariate regression case.) If x and c are positively correlated
(φxc is positive), the effect of measurement error will bias the OLS estimate of β
downward and then α upward. That is exactly how measurement error leads to a
positive coefficient on cash flow while it should be zero in the frictionless world by
theory. However, if x and c are negatively correlated, which means φxc   0, then
measurement error will bias both the estimates of β and α downward.
The negative correlation between cash flow and investment opportunities as proxied
by Tobin’s q can emerge for several reasons: First, as mentioned in Rampini &
Viswanathan (2010), economic downturn indicates low cash flow state, but it also
leads to low price of capital and thus good investment opportunities. This creates a
scenario in which cash flow and investment opportunities are negatively correlated.
Second, marginal q is not only informative about the shocks to productivity, it also
captures the shocks to adjustment technology (see Papanikolaou 2011, Belo et al. 2014,
among others). A positive shock on adjustment technology, which lowers investment
frictions and improves investment opportunities, accompanied by a negative shock on
4This is the result of partialling out cash flow variable (see footnote 2).
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output can lead to a negative relationship between marginal q and cash flow. Third,
Decamps, Gryglewicz, Morellec & Villeneuve (2016) argue that cash flow is subject
to both permanent shocks and transitory shocks. While the former not only affect
a firm’s immediate productivity, but also change the long-run aspects of the firm’s
profitability and thereby investment opportunities. The transitory shocks, however,
only influence the firm’s short-run cash flow and are uninformative about the firm’s
future productivity (see also Chang et al. 2014, Gryglewicz et al. 2017, among others).
When the transitory shocks exhibit negative correlation with the permanent shocks, one
should observe a negative correlation between cash flow and investment opportunities.
For instance, if the firms face an adverse shock in the consumer preferences while at
the same time receive a cash windfall (e.g., a won lawsuit, an acceleration in customer
payment), cash flows will vary negatively with the future growth opportunities.
4.2.2 Non-classical measurement error theory
High-order moment-based GMM estimator by Erickson & Whited (2000) (EW esti-
mator) has been criticized due to the distributional assumption imposed on the data,
in which marginal q variable must display high degrees of skewness. Most of all, EW
(2000) rely on the classical assumptions of measurement error theory in order to derive
high-order moment-based GMM estimator. With a classical measurement error, EW
estimator can provide consistent estimates but it performs poorly if measurement
error is non-classical. Although EW (2000) provide economic reasonale for the zero
independence between regression error u and explanatory variables, some of the other
assumptions may not necessarily hold.
The measurement error can be non-classical in the sense that the error is correlated
with the latent true q variable, that is, Epχeq  0. According to Hayashi (1982),
measurement error may arise in the presence of market power or decreasing returns-to-
scale in the production function, which makes average q depart from marginal q. The
divergence between average q and marginal q equals a fraction of expected discounted
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revenue stream, scaled by capital. As marginal q represents the expected discounted
value of future marginal net profit from investing one extra unit of capital, positive
correlation between marginal q and measurement error may exist. Also, we expect
that a positive relationship between cash flow and measurement error may be present.
On the other hand, average q understates marginal q by ignoring the collateral effect
of investment as installed capital can relax the borrowing constraints (Hennessy 2004,
Hennessy, Levy & Whited 2007). The collateral value of investment represents another
source of measurement error. The collateral value of investment changes with the
amount of capital investment, therefore one should expect it to change with marginal
q as well since the optimality condition equates marginal q with marginal cost of
investment.
Now we turn to Eqn (4.2.4) and Eqn (4.2.5) but remove the assumption that e is
uncorrelated to χ. The probability limit of the OLS estimate on q coefficient under
Epχeq  0 is thereby5




Covpe, χ|zq denotes the covariance between measurement error and latent true q after
partialling out the effect of z. Downward bias will be aggravated when Covpe, χ|zq ¡ 0.
Again, the downward bias brought by βˆOLS will spill over and push the OLS estimates
of α downward via the negative φxc.
Next, we investigate the impact of non-classical measurement error on EW estimator.
We focus on the third-order-product moment condition in Erickson & Whited (2000,
2002) by expressing p 9y, 9xq in terms of β and moments of pu, e, 9χq:
Ep 9y2 9xq  β2Ep 9χ3q   β2Ep 9χ2eq, Ep 9y 9x2q  βEp 9χ3q   βEp 9χe2q   2βEp 9χ2eq.











under the identifying assumptions that β  0 and Ep 9χ3q  0 and, also the
classical assumptions that Ep 9χ2eq  0 and Ep 9χe2q  0. However, it is clear that
by dividing one can not recover GMM3 estimator if the independence requirement
between measurement error and true q, i.e. Ep 9χ2eq  0, Ep 9χe2q  0, is relaxed. More
specifically,
plimpβˆGMM3q  Ep 9y
2
9xq
Ep 9y 9x2q  β
 
1  Ep 9χ
2eq   Ep 9χe2q
Ep 9χ3q   Ep 9χe2q   2Ep 9χ2eq

.
The above expression equals β when Ep 9χ2eq  Ep 9χe2q  0. The bias arises from the
dependence between 9χ and e and the bias is more pronounced if Ep 9χ3q is low, meaning
that marginal q is not highly skewed. The estimator will exert a downward bias on βˆ
when the moments of measurement error and marginal q are positive. The bias on the
estimate of α is also pronounced for higher-order moment estimator. The probability
limit of coefficient on cash flow variable is
plimpαˆGMM3q  φyc  φxcplimpβˆGMM3q.
Again, the bias on the q coefficient estimates will spill over and affect the estimates
on cash flow coefficient when φxc  0. Almeida, Campello & Galvao (2010) argue
that instrumental-variables-type estimator (IV estimator) using lagged mismeasured
regressor as instruments performs better than EW estimator. However, as shown
in Erickson & Whited (2012), it also produces bias on the estimates of q coefficient
and then on cash flow coefficient if the measurement error is serially correlated. As
in Almeida, Campello & Galvao (2010), one needs to take first difference to the
equations Eqn (4.2.4) and Eqn (4.2.5) to eliminate individual effects. Using twice
lagged value of empirical q ( 9xit2) as instrumental variable, the IV estimator for
β is β  Covp 9xit2,∆ 9yitq
Covp 9xit2,∆ 9xitq
. The probability limit of IV estimator for β is plimpβq 
βCovp 9xit2,∆ 9χitq
Covp 9xit2,∆ 9χitq Covp 9xit2,∆eitq
. Covp 9xit2,∆eitq  0 if eit is serially correlated. If both
Covp 9xit2,∆eitq and Covp 9xit2,∆ 9χitq are negative, IV estimator may underestimate
β.
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4.3 Data and summary statistics
The sample is extracted from the Compustat industry annual file, covering all manufac-
turing firms (SIC between 2000 and 3999) incorporated in the U.S. between 1970 and
2016. Inside the parenthesis, we write the data name in the Compustat industry annual
file. Investment is measured as capital expenditure (capx ) on an annual basis. Net
capital is defined as net property, plant and equipment (ppent). Cash flow is income
before extraordinary items (ib) plus depreciation and amortization (dp). Change in
cash holdings is the change of cash and short-term investments (che). The growth
opportunities is proxied by Tobin’s q, which is the market value divided by the book
value. Market-to-book of asset ratio (denoted byMB) is defined as the market value of
assets (the market value of assets is market value of common stock (prcc_fcsho) plus
total assets (at) minus total common equity (ceq) minus deferred taxes (txdb)) divided
by total value of book assets (at). The disadvantage of this widely-used measure is
that it reflects the growth opportunities for all assets rather than just capital stock
(Erickson & Whited 2012). Hence, we also measure Tobin’s q as market-to-book ratio
of capital stock (denoted by qK) since it leads to less measurement-error biases relative
to market-to-book of assets ratio. We adopt the construction of qK in Chen & Chen
(2012), market value of capital is computed as market value of assets (the sum of
market value of common stock, total liability (lt), and preferred stock (pstk) minus
deferred taxes (txditc), less the difference between book value of assets (at) and book
value of capital (ppent). By this design, we remove the value of current asset as well
as all other asset such as intangible asset which do not account for the market value
of capital stock. It eliminates the concern that Tobin’s q may capture more than the
contribution of capital stock if unquantifiable asset value is included in the numerator.6
We use the market-to-book ratio at the beginning of the period since managers make
investment decisions upon observing investment opportunities at the start of the year.
According to the q theory, both capital expenditure and cash flow are deflated by
6EW (2012) report that placing the sum of debt and equity less current assets as numerator will
create room for a bias if total assets consist of more than capital stock and current assets.
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capital stock (Hayashi & Inoue 1991). Following Almeida et al. (2004), we also delete
the firms that have sales or asset growth exceeding 100% to eliminate the effect of
business discontinuities. We drop the observations with assets, sales or capital stock
less than 1 million USD to eliminate the effect of outliers. We winsorize all relevant
variables at 1% in each year.
Table 4.1 provides summary statistics, serial correlations and cross-variable correlations
for the regression variables. We divide the full sample into two periods: earlier period
1970-1990 and recent period 1991-2016. We report the results for q variable measured by
both market-to-book of capital (qK) and market-to-book of asset (MB) ratio. It shows
that cash flow and Tobin’s q have high volatility in the late decades. Also another three
salient features are present: First, q variable, measured by qK or MB, has displayed a
high degree of skewness, which is an important assumption underlining EW estimator
(EW estimator is formed with the non-zero third-order moment being the denominator).
Second, qK is highly autocorrelated in both early periods and recent periods, which
may undermine the use of instrumental-variables-type estimators (Almeida et al. 2010).
Third, q variables are negatively correlated with cash flow variables in the recent
decades, which lays foundations for our explanation of investment-cash flow sensitivity
via the variance-covariance structure between cash flow and q.
4.4 Estimations across time
4.4.1 The time-series pattern of cash flow sensitivities
We divide the full sample into 9 five-year subsample periods. Inv. is defined as
the firm’s capital expenditure. ∆Cash is defined as the change of firm’s cash and
short-term securities. CF is firm’s income before extraordinary items plus depreciation.
Then, we perform a regression of investment on beginning-of-year Tobin’s q (denoted
as Q) and cash flow with firm-specific and year fixed effects. For each five-year period,
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Table 4.1: Summary statistics
This table displays summary statistics for the main regressor variables. The firm-level data is collected
for all manufacturing firms (SIC code between 2000 and 3999) in U.S. from Compustat, covering
1970-2016 period. The full sample is divided into two periods: 1970-1990 and 1991-2016. For each
of the variable, it reports mean, standard deviation, skewness, kurtosis, first-order serial correlation
and the correlation across the variables. All variables that are normalized by K (AT) are divided by
beginning-of-period net property, plant and equipment (total book value of assets). Inv. is defined
as the firm’s capital expenditure. ∆Cash is defined as the change of firm’s cash and short-term
securities. CF is firm’s income before extraordinary items plus depreciation. qK is beginning-of-period
Tobin’s q measured by market value of capital scaled by net property, plant and equipment. MB is







Inv./K ∆Cash/AT qK MB CF/K
Inv./K 0.256 0.206 2.236 9.847 0.412 1.000





qK 2.183 3.545 3.792 22.264 0.803 0.295 0.052 1.000
MB 1.283 0.782 3.225 17.822 0.831 0.259 0.058 0.886 1.000
CF/K 0.344 0.446 -
0.521







Inv./K ∆Cash/AT qK MB CF/K
Inv./K 0.246 0.230 2.378 10.179 0.487 1.000
∆Cash/AT 0.008 0.111 0.852 8.780 -
0.063
0.008 1.000
qK 7.809 16.326 5.446 44.672 0.366 0.366 0.054 1.000
MB 1.828 1.279 2.638 12.156 0.487 0.287 0.104 0.676 1.000
CF/K 0.082 2.037 -
4.263






the OLS regression is run:
Inv./Kit  γ0   βQit1   αCF/Kit   it, (4.4.1)
where α (β) is the cash flow (q) sensitivity of investment. In this subsample-period
regression, Qit1 is beginning-of-year Tobin’s q measured by market-to-book of capital
ratio (qK). With regard to the cash flow sensitivity of cash, we follow Almeida,
Campello & Weisbach (2004) and perform the following regression:
∆Cash/ATit  γ0   βQit1   αCF/ATit   γ1Sizeit   it, (4.4.2)
where α (β) is the cash flow (q) sensitivity of cash. The change in cash holdings and
cash flow are deflated by total assets, Qit1 is beginning-of-year Tobin’s q measured






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The top panel of Table 4.2 reports the coefficient estimates of investment on cash
flow and Tobin’s q measured by market-to-book of capital ratio (qK). The bottom
panel reports the the coefficient estimates of cash on cash flow and market-to-book of
asset ratio (MB). We apply OLS estimator as well as EW’s (2000, 2002) high-order
moment-based GMM estimator (EW estimator), which are intended to address the
measurement error in q under the classical assumption. GMM3 (GMM5) denotes
EW estimator which uses information of moments up to 3 (5).7 The appeal of
using overidentified estimator (GMM5 estimator) is that it can provide the J-test of
overidentifying conditions, which can be used to examine departures from the classical
assumptions of EW estimators. We employ both GMM3 and GMM5 estimators as the
results based on GMM5 estimator are sensitive to the change of starting values (EW,
2012).8 Within-transformation is usually applied to remove the individual fixed effect.
Nonetheless, Lewellen & Lewellen (2016) are reluctant to demean variables as it requires
firms to have multiple observations and hence induces biases on the slope estimates.
Also EW (2012) suggest that EW estimator produces significant biases if within-
transformation is applied to eliminate the firm fixed effect. Therefore, we report results
for data both in the within-transformation form and in the level form as in EW (2012).
The OLS estimates of investment-cash flow sensitivity decrease over time and similar
pattern is shown for the GMM estimates albeit less pronounced, consistent with what
Chen & Chen (2012) have documented. For instance, OLS estimate of α equals 0.27
and is statistically significant in 1972-1976. Afterwards, it decreases and disappears,
becoming statistically insignificant in the recent years. The GMM5 estimator of
investment-cash flow sensitivity stands the J-test of overidentifying restrictions in the
early years at 5% significance level but it fails in the recent years.9 The decreasing
pattern can also be observed for the OLS estimates and GMM5 estimates of cash-cash
7Please refer to Section 2 for details of GMM3 estimtor and Appendix 4.B for details regarding
GMM4 or GMM5 (higher-order moment-based estimator).
8The starting value we use are OLS estimates, GMM3 estimates and 0.1 to 0.5 with an increment
of 0.1
9Note that the failure in J-test of overidentifying restrictions indicates that one of the classical
assumptions is violated
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flow sensitivity. OLS coefficients for cash flow sensitivity of cash decline but they still
remain significant in the late periods. GMM3 estimates of cash-cash flow sensitivity
are negative in 5 out of 9 periods, in line with the argument of negative propensity to
save (Riddick & Whited 2009), while GMM5 estimator only shows negative cash-cash
flow sensitivity in 2012-2016. All of the tests of overidentifying restrictions for GMM5
estimator of cash-cash flow sensitivity fail. The OLS and GMM3 estimates on Q
are mostly insignificant, which echoes the argument in Almeida et al. (2004) that Q
is less important in the cash-cash flow regression. Almeida et al. (2004) point out
that cash-cash flow regression places financial variable as opposed to real variable on
the left hand side and the measurement error in q has is less of a concern. Hence,
most of the measurement-error-in-q literature focus on the study of investment-cash
flow sensitivity.10. We thereafter use investment-cash flow sensitivity as a subject to
examine the impact of the measurement error.
We plot the investment-q sensitivity and investment-cash flow sensitivity for each year
in Figure 4.1 and Figure 4.2. In this year-by-year regressions, we also use market-to-
book of asset ratio (MB) to proxy for Tobin’s q based on Almeida & Campello (2007).
The OLS estimates and GMM5 estimates of α (investment-cash flow sensitivity) and
β (investment-q sensitivity) are presented by year for both data in the level form and
in the within-transformation form in Figure 4.1 (qK as Tobin’s q) and Figure 4.2 (MB
as Tobin’s q). There are no substantial difference in the regression results between
the leveled data and the within-transformed data except that one can observe more
negative estimates for α with the within-transformed data in late years. The OLS
estimates of cash flow sensitivity have declined gradually over time and eventually
became insignificantly different from zero. GMM5 estimates of investment-cash flow
sensitivity began to decline from 1980s. After 2000, they became essentially small
and statistically insignificant (15 out of 17 estimated cash flow sensitivities from 2000
10The examples of contributions that study investment-cash flow sensitivity via the channel of
measurement error are Erickson & Whited (2000, 2002, 2012), Gomes (2001), Alti (2003), Cooper &
Ejarque (2003), Cummins, Hassett & Oliner (2006), Almeida, Campello & Galvao (2010), Ağca &
Mozumdar (2017), among others
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Figure 4.1: Investment-cash flow sensitivity by year (qK as Tobin’s q)
OLS regression
(a) Data in levels (b) Within-transformed data
GMM5 estimation
(c) Data in levels
J-statistic: 140.71 (0.000) τ2: 0.411
(d) Within-transformed data
J-statistic: 59.89 (0.000) τ2: 0.403
Note: Tobin’s q is measured as market-to-book ratio of capital stock. The first two graph
plots coefficients on cash flow (solid line, plotted against the left axis) and q (long-dashed
line, plotted against the right axis) by running OLS regression of investment on q and cash
flow. The results are reported for data in levels (a,c) and within-transformed data (b,d).
The last two graphs plot coefficients on cash flow (solid line, plotted against the left axis)
and q (long-dashed line, plotted against the right axis) estimated with fifth-order moment
estimator (GMM5), for data in levels (b) and within-transformed data (d). J-tests of
overidentifying restrictions for the panel estimations of 1970-2016 along with their p-values
are provided below the graph of GMM5 estimation. τ2 (reported below the GMM5 graph)
is a measure of the proxy quality of qK . Shaded areas indicate 95% confidence interval.
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Figure 4.2: Investment-cash flow sensitivity by year (MB as Tobin’s q)
OLS regression
(a) Data in levels (b) Within-transformed data
GMM5 estimation
(c) Data in levels
J-statistic: 243.74 (0.000) τ2: 0.217
(d) Within-transformed data
J-statistic: 64.26 (0.000) τ2: 0.257
Note: Tobin’s q is measured as market-to-book ratio of total assets. The first two graph plots
coefficients on cash flow (solid line, plotted against the left axis) and Tobin’s q (long-dashed
line, plotted against the right axis) by running OLS regression of investment on q and cash
flow. The results are reported for data in levels (a,c) and within-transformed data (b,d). The
last two graphs plot coefficients on cash flow (solid line, plotted against the left axis) and q
(long-dashed line, plotted against the right axis) estimated with fifth-order moment estimator
(GMM5), for data in levels (b) and within-transformed data (d). J-tests of overidentifying
restrictions for the panel estimations of 1970-2016 along with their p-values are provided
below the graph of GMM5 estimation. τ2 (reported below the GMM5 graph) is a measure
of the proxy quality of MB. Shaded areas indicate 95% confidence interval.
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to 2016 are insignificant). Panel estimation for observations from 1970 to 2016 with
GMM5 estimator is also carried out to test the overidentification restrictions and
measurement quality of q. τ 2 is an index for the proxy quality of q. Consistent with
EW (2012), it shows that market-to-book ratio of capital stock, rather than total
assets, is a better proxy for investment opportunities. The J-statistic is quite large
for both the leveled data and the within-transformed data, indicating that one of
the EW-estimator assumptions is not satisfied. Overall, cash flow sensitivities of
investment estimated by both OLS estimator and EW estimator have shown lower
values in the late years than those in the early periods.
4.4.2 Variance-covariance structure over time
The neoclassical frictionless q-investment theory (Lucas & Prescott (1971) and Mussa
(1977)), under which optimality condition equates marginal return of capital (marginal
q) with marginal cost of investment, predicts that cash flow should have no explanatory
power on investment (α  0). Denote φQcf as the linear projection of q on cash flow.
Note that φQcf  CovpQ,cfqVarpcfq when only cash flow is included in explaining q. We have
shown in Eqn (4.2.8) that the bias aﬄicting q coefficients will drive the estimates of
cash flow sensitivity (α) upward from its theoretical value if there is positive covariance
between q and cash flow (i.e., positive φQcf). One the other hand, it would drive
estimated α downward from or toward zero if there is negative or close-to-zero φQcf .
In order to associate the time-series structure of variance-covariance with the pattern
of cash flow sensitivity, we plot φQcf for each year in Figure 4.3. Again we consider
both data in levels and data that are within-transformed. It reveals that φQcf is
highly positive in the early years but decrease significantly over time and toward
zero. For the data in levels, one can observe a negative φQcf in the recent years. For
within-transformed data, the negative values are less common but φQcf still exhibit an
extremely small magnitude. Such a pattern explains why the estimated α is low in
the recent periods as it is biased downward from (for negative φQcf ) or toward its true
value (for small φQcf ). Therefore, we argue that, via the variance-covariance channel,
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Figure 4.3: Covariance structure of Tobin’s q and cash flow by year
Panel A: qK as Tobin’s q
φQcf for data in levels φQcf for within-transformed data
Panel B: MB as Tobin’s q
φQcf for data in levels φQcf for within-transformed data
Note: Graph (a) and (b) plot the φQcf when Q is proxied by market-to-book of capital ratio.
Graph (c) and (d) plot the φQcf when Q is proxied by market-to-book of asset ratio. φQcf
for data in levels is measured as CovpQ,cfqVarpcfq when both Q and cf are in the level form. φQcf
for within-transformed data is measured as CovpQ,cfqVarpcfq when both Q and cf are demeaned to
remove the individual fixed effect.
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measurement error, although inflates the estimates of investment-cash flow sensitivity
in the early periods when φQcf is positive, diminishes the estimates of α in the late
periods when φQcf is negative or small.
4.4.3 The effect of covariance on the time-series pattern
In this section, we aim to quantify the effect of measurement error on the time-series
trend of cash flow sensitivity under the classical assumption. We simulate N  1000
individual observations in each simulation and we repeat the procedures 2000 times
before the average is taken over the 2000 simulations. The following outlines our
data-generating process. We simulate the following variables: yi, zi, χi, which are
assumed to be normally distributed and have the same mean, variance and covariance
as investment, cash flow, Tobin’s average q respectively from the actual data set. The
simulation of the covariance between variables is performed via Cholesky decomposition.
Then we pretend that the Tobin’s average q, denoted as χi, is the true marginal q and
artificially add measurement error to the χi (See similar methods in Dasgupta et al.
2011).
xi  χi   ei,
where χi is regarded as the true q (error-free q) and xi is the empirical q measured
with error (mismeasured q). In line with the classical assumption of measurement
error, ei  Np0, σ2peqq is a mean zero error independent of χi and zi. σ2pχqσ2pxq reflects the
quality of measurement. One can adjust the variance of ei to match the measurement
quality to the value of around 0.5 as reported in Erickson & Whited (2000), i.e., the
variance of ei is set to be same as the variance of χi. After variables of interest are
generated, we run the regression of yi on χi (xi) and zi.
Table 4.3 presents the OLS regression results with error-free q (χi) and mismeasured q
(xi) respectively. It shows that when q variable carries a measurement error, coefficients
on q will always be biased downward. However, the direction of bias in cash flow
coefficients changes over time. Adding measurement error will bias the cash flow
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coefficients upward in the early periods from 1977 to 1996 and bias the coefficients
on cash flow downward in the late periods from 1997 to 2016. It supports our
proposition that measurement error amplifies the cash flow sensitivity in the early
years but diminishes the cash flow sensitivity in the recent years, which gives rise
to the decreasing trend of cash flow sensitivity. The estimated cash flow sensitivity
β2 declined from 0.2418 in 1977-1981 to 0.0016 in 2012-2016 for the regression with
mismeasured q, but the decline is less pronounced, going from 0.2167 to 0.0071, for
the regression with error-free q. The time trend for β2 shows that the declining trend
has increased by around 16% from -0.0268 to -0.0318 if error is included in the q.
Table 4.3: Regression with simulated data variables
The table reports estimation results from baseline linear regression with simulated data:
yi  β0   β1χi   β2zi   ε where yi, χi and zi are simulated to match the first and second
moment observed in the actual data. χi is the error-free q. The fourth and fifth column
report results from regression model yi  β0   β1xi   β2zi   ε where xi is q measured with
error. +/- denotes increase/decrease from the estimates using error-free q as regressor.
Trend is estimated as regressing the coefficients on the period trend variable, which is 1 in
1977-1981, 2 in 1982-1987 and so forth.
Error-free q is treated as regressor Mismeasured q is treated as regressor
Period β1 β2 β1 β2
1977-1981 0.0255 0.2167 0.0118(-) 0.2438(+)
1982-1986 0.0227 0.1213 0.0108(-) 0.1471(+)
1987-1991 0.0121 0.0764 0.0058(-) 0.0866(+)
1992-1996 0.0125 0.0670 0.0061(-) 0.0749(+)
1997-2001 0.0086 0.0246 0.0043(-) 0.0213(-)
2002-2006 0.0068 0.0137 0.0034(-) 0.0105(-)
2007-2011 0.0060 0.0110 0.0030(-) 0.0080(-)
2012-2016 0.0038 0.0071 0.0018(-) 0.0016(-)
Trend -0.0030 -0.0268 -0.0014 -0.0318
4.5 Constrained vs unconstrained firms
Investment-cash flow sensitivity occurs when firms are financially constrained. It is
argued that a wedge between the internal and external costs of capital causes a firm’s
investment to depend on the availability of internal funds and such dependence is more
pronounced for firms facing greater financial constraints (Fazzari et al. 1988). Kaplan
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& Zingales (1997), on the other hand, find that firms that are financially healthy can
exhibit a high cash flow sensitivity of investment. In order to study the role of financial
constraints on investment demand, researchers offered a variety of a priori measures
of financing frictions. Conflicting arguments about investment-cash flow sensitivity as
evidence of financial constraints arise when one uses different criterion to sort the firms
into financially constrained and unconstrained groups. Fazzari et al. (1988) regard
firms who retain more earnings and pay less dividends as more constrained and show
that low-dividend (constrained) firms display higher cash flow sensitivity of investment.
EW (2000) recommend using bond rating as an indicator of firm’s financial constraints
and find that investment of constrained firms are less sensitive to cash flow. Also
Kaplan-Zingales (KZ) index (Lamont et al. 2001), Whited-Wu (WW) index (Whited
& Wu 2006) and Hadlock-Pierce (HP) index (Hadlock & Pierce 2010) are used broadly
to identify firms’ constraint status. In particular, Hadlock & Pierce (2010) sort firms
according to KZ, WW and HP indices and reveal that financial constraints do not
lead to a higher investment-cash flow sensitivity.
To test the implications of the covariance-variance structure on investment-cash flow
sensitivity, we sort the firms into financially-constrained and financially-unconstrained
according to WW index, KZ index, HP index, bond ratings and dividend payout ratio
on an annual basis. The classification scheme is outlined in Appendix 4.A. Information
about bond rating starts from mid-1980, hence, we look at the period of 1985-2016.
Table 4.4 reports the OLS estimates on cash flow sensitivity and q sensitivity of
investment for different subsamples of firms. The cash flow sensitivity estimates for
constrained firms range between 0.004 to 0.022 while the estimates for unconstrained
vary between 0.014 and 0.049. Consistent with the findings in EW (2000) and Hadlock
& Pierce (2010), OLS estimator of investment-cash flow sensitivity does not return
larger values for constrained firms with WW-index-, KZ-index-, HP-index- and bond-
ratings-measures of financial constraints. We also report the covariance between Q
and cash flow with individual and year fixed effect partialling out from Q (denoted as
φQcf ) for different subsamples of firms. It is shown that constrained firms which have
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Table 4.4: OLS regression for constrained v.s. unconstrained firms
This table reports OLS estimation results during 1985-2016 across groups of financially
constrained and unconstrained firms. The dependent variable is capital expenditure scaled
by beginning-of-year property, plant and equipment. Independent variables are cash flow and
Q. All regressions include firm and year fixed effects. The table report the OLS regression
estimates on Q and cash flow, adjusted R square, number of observations, the projection
of Q on cash flow with individual and year fixed effect partialling out (denoted as φQcf )
respectively. Firms are categorized as financially constrained according to Whited-Wu (2005)
index, Kaplan-Zingales (1997) index, Hadlock-Pierce (2010) index, bond ratings and dividend
payout history. , , indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.
Dependent Variable: Independent Variables:
Investment Q Cash flow R2a Obs. φQcf
Constrained Criteria
1. Whited-Wu index
Constrained firms 0.005 0.011 0.309 16639 -0.757
(0.000) (0.002) (0.283)
Unconstrained firms 0.006 0.049 0.401 19149 4.904
(0.001) (0.007) (0.740)
2. Kaplan-Zingales index
Constrained firms 0.008 0.005 0.309 16015 -0.628
(0.001) (0.003) (0.225)
Unconstrained firms 0.005 0.015 0.458 15394 0.753
(0.000) (0.003) (0.417)
3. Hadlock-Pierce index
Constrained firms 0.005 0.004 0.338 11201 -0.508
(0.000) (0.003) (0.298)
Unconstrained firms 0.006 0.033 0.429 15824 2.264
(0.001) (0.005) (0.547)
4. Bond ratings
Constrained firms 0.006 0.015 0.339 36320 0.113
(0.000) (0.002) (0.245)
Unconstrained firms 0.006 0.030 0.479 11358 2.793
(0.001) (0.006) (0.514)
5. Dividend ratio
Constrained firms 0.006 0.022 0.275 7792 -0.750
(0.001) (0.003) (0.544)
Unconstrained firms 0.006 0.014 0.385 39886 0.539
(0.000) (0.002) (0.232)
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high WW-index, KZ-index, HP-index and no bond-ratings display negative or much
lower φQcf . The exante literature (e.g., Kaplan & Zingales 1997) often attributes the
reverse pattern in investment-cash flow sensitivity to its failure to capture the financial
status of the firms. However, we find that the negative covariance between cash flow
and q, which leads to a downward bias on the estimate of cash flow coefficient, also
contributes to the lower investment-cash flow sensitivity for constrained firms. In
Table 4.4, we show that the OLS estimates of investment-cash flow sensitivity are
largely underestimated for the constrained firms with high WW-index, KZ-index,
HP-index and no bond-ratings due to the negative (firms with high WW-index, KZ-
index, HP-index) or the low (firms with no bond-ratings) covariance between cash
flow and q. Therefore, it offers a re-examination for the argument that low estimated
investment-cash flow sensitivity for constrained firms represents its limited capacity to
measure the degree of financial constraints faced by firms.
4.6 Monte Carlo design
We use Monte Carlo simulations to assess the performance of OLS estimator, EW
estimator and IV estimator (instrumental variables-type estimator) under the classical
error and the non-classical error in this section. As in Almeida et al. (2010), we first
study the cross-sectional setting, focusing on the performance of OLS estimator and
EW estimator. And then we proceed to the panel setting, examining the performance
of OLS estimator, EW estimator and IV estimator. We run two sets of Monte Carlo
experiments with the simulated data: First, the measurement error is uncorrelated
with the true variable or the error is classical. Second, there is a correlation between
the measurement error and the true variable (a non-classical error).
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4.6.1 The cross-sectional case
We simulate N  2000 individual observations and we repeat the procedures 2000
times before the average is taken over the 2000 simulations. The following outlines
our data-generating process. The response variable yi is generated according to:
yi  γ0   χiβ   ziα   ui,
where χi is the mismeasured and unobservable true variable and zi is the perfectly-
measured variable. β and α are coefficients associated with χi and zi respectively. ui
is the regression error in the model. To mimic the variance of investment-to-capital
ratio, ui has a standard deviation of 0.2. The empirical proxy for χi is
xi  χi   ei.
As qK displays high degree of skewness as shown in Table 4.1 and also the EW estimator
is built around the notion of high skewness, we modulate the skewness of χi by using
gamma distributions with the shape parameter of 0.16. χi is set to have a standard
deviation of σχ  5 and ei is set to have a standard deviation of σe  1 to emulate the
large variance displayed by qK . Under the classical error,
Corrpei, χiq  0.
This classical assumptions are relaxed to allow the measurement error to correlate
with the mismeasured true variable where
Corrpei, χiq  0.
Specifically, measurement error is generated as ei  θχi 
?
1  θ2v˜i where θ controls the
correlation between measurement error and latent variable. v˜i is an i.i.d. with standard
normal distribution. The correlation between measurement and latent variable defines
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the non-classical error. In the following simulation, we set the correlation between
non-classical error and latent variable as Corrpei, χiq  0.3. As in Almeida et al. (2010),
our simulation considers cross-sectional correlation among regressors. The correlation
allows the measurement error to contaminate the estimated slope coefficients on the
perfectly-measured variables. The perfectly-measured variable under the classical
error is generated as zi  σzp ρσχχi  
ap1  ρ2qviq. zi has a mean of zero and a
standard deviation of σz  0.4. vi is an i.i.d. term independent of χi with standard
normal distribution. ρ represents the correlation between mismeasured variable χi
and perfectly-measured variable zi. It is allowed to go from -0.3 to 0.3. ρ controls the
correlation between marginal q and cash flow in the actual data set. The reasoning
behind the negative relationship between cash flow and q is discussed in Section 4.2.
For simplity, zi is generated in a way that it has zero correlation with the measurement
error such that Covpzi, χiq  Covpzi, xiq 11. The values we choose for pβ, αq are (0.05,
0.01). The Monte Carlo simulation output is presented in Table 4.5. We obtain these
results by using OLS estimator, GMM3, GMM4 and GMM5 estimators. Note that z
is analogous to cash flow in the empirical works, χ is analogous to true marginal q
and x is analogous to empirical Tobin’s average q. The estimated coefficients on proxy
variable x, denoted as β, is analogous to investment-q sensitivity in the empirical case.
The estimated coefficients on perfectly-measured variables z, defined as α, is analogous
to investment-cash flow sensitivity in the empirical case. For each of the estimator, we
present the RMSE (root mean squared errors), bias and its corresponding t statistic
for the estimated β and α with different levels of Corrpzi, χiq. For GMM4 and GMM5
estimators, we also report the rejection rate of 5% J-test, which is the fraction of
Monte Carlo trials in which the J-test rejects the model overidentifying restrictions at
the 5% significance level.
11Although one might expect a positive relationship between cash flow (represented by zi) and
measurement error (represented by ei), the positive-correlation assumption will only amplify the
biases and strengthen our arguments. To achieve zero correlation between zi and ei, one needs to




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































For the OLS estimator, the downward biases for q coefficients are larger in the case of
non-classical error, as proven by Eqn (4.2.9). In both classical and non-classical cases,
the downward bias in β causes a upward bias in α only when z and χ are positively
correlated. The downward bias in α can be observed when z and χ are negatively
correlated and is more pronounced under a non-classical error. For EW estimator, the
biases for β and α are close to zero and statistically insignificant under the classical
error. However, the downward bias in β is significant when the measurement error
is non-classical, which unsurprisingly, leads to a prominent bias on α when z and
χ are correlated. Therefore, negative bias in α still exists when there is a negative
correlation between z and χ even for EW estimators in the presence of a non-classical
error. RMSEs greatly increased in the case of non-classical error as compared to the
case of classical error. With regard to the J-test, there is no significant difference
between the classical and non-classical error. The results therefore show that J-test is
not very powerful in detecting the non-classical error.
To examine the effect of a non-classical error, we allow the correlation between
measurement error and true latent variables (denoted as Corrpe, χq) to vary between
0 and 0.5. Notably, Corrpe, χq gauge the degree that error can be classified as
non-classical. The Corrpχ, zq adopts a negative value and stays at -0.3. The other
parameters are the same as above. The results are plotted in Figure 4.4. The left
graph reports the bias in the coefficient on the latent variables χ and the right graph
reports the bias in the coefficient on the perfectly-measured variables z. In the graphs,
solid line plots the bias (difference between the estimated and true value divided by
the true value) and the RMSE for OLS estimator and dashed line plots the bias and
the RMSE for GMM5 estimator (EW estimator) with varying level of Corrpe, χq.
The first notable result is that the absolute bias in estimated α and β is increasing
with the correlation between measurement error (e) and true latent variable (χ). For
both OLS and GMMM5 estimator, the estimated β are biased downward. Due to
the negative correlation between z and χ, both OLS and GMMM5 estimator produce
a downward bias for α as well. When the measurement error and the true latent
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Figure 4.4: Bias and RMSE with a varying degree of correlation
Note: The solid (dashed) line in the top-left graph plots the bias of estimated coefficients
on the mismeasured variable for OLS estimator (GMM5 or EW estimator). The bias is
computed as difference between the estimated and true value divided by the true value.
The solid (dashed) line in the top-right graph plots the bias of estimated coefficients
on the perfectly-measured variable for OLS estimator (GMM5 or EW estimator). The
solid (dashed) line in the bottom-left graph plots the RMSE (root mean squared error)
of estimated coefficients on the mismeasured variable for OLS estimator (GMM5 or EW
estimator). The solid (dashed) line in the bottom-right graph plots the RMSE (root mean
squared error) of estimated coefficients on the perfectly-measured variable for OLS estimator
(GMM5 or EW estimator).
variable are uncorrelated, or the error is classical, the coefficient biases of GMM5
estimator are small. However, the bias for OLS estimator is still large even with zero
correlation between measurement error and true latent variable. For example, the
true value of α is 0.1. The GMM5 estimator yields an estimate for α of 0.0105 and
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OLS estimator yields an estimate of 0.025 when Corrpe, χq  0. As the measurement
error begins to display non-classical feature (Corrpe, χq ¡ 0), one can observe large
biases of estimated α and β for both OLS and GMM5 estimators. For RMSEs, it
increases with the correlation between measurement error and latent variable as well
for both OLS estimator and GMM5 estimator. When Corrpe, χq  0.3, the root mean
squared error for αˆ is 0.02 for OLS estimator and 0.017 for GMM5 estimator. Taken
together, the results show that non-classical error can bias the estimates of α even for
EW estimator as EW estimator fails to purge the measurement error when the error
exhibits a correlation with latent variable.
4.6.2 The panel case
The drawback of using instrumental-variables estimator is the assumption of zero serial
correlation in the variables. This seems to be too strong a assumption as both market-
to-book of asset ratio and market-to-book of capital ratio are highly autocorrelated
(see Table 2.1). We simulate a panel with N  2000 individuals and the length of
T  50. The response variable is generated according to
yit  γ0   ζi   χitβ   zitα   uit,




controls the standard deviation of the fixed effect and is set at 0.1. The empirical
proxy for χi is
xit  χit   eit,
where χit follows an AR(1) process
χit  φχχit1   ηit,
where ηit is an i.i.d. innovation to this process with zero-mean and unit-variance
gamma distribution. φχ is the autocorrelation coefficient of the process and we
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set it to be 0.8. To study the case of non-classical error, measurement error eit
is assumed to be correlated with χit and is designed as eit  θχit  
?
1  θ2vit for
t  1 . . . T where θ modulates the correlation between measurement error and latent
variable and is assumed to be 0.3. Again vit is an i.i.d. across time and across
individuals with standard normal distribution. In this manner, eit is automatically set
to have serial correlation as χit is autocorrelated. As in the cross-sectional case, we
allow perfectly-measured variable to correlate with latent variable cross-sectionally:




p1  ρ2qvitq for t  1 . . . T . We experiment with ρ  0.3, ρ  0
and ρ  0.3 respectively. To apply the IV estimator, we consider the equation in
first-differences to remove the individual fixed effect and use xit2 as the instrument.
As a comparison, we also report the results estimated with EW estimator (GMM5
estimator). The bias and RMSE for OLS estimator, IV estimator, GMM5 estimator
of α and β are shown in Table 4.6.
Table 4.6 shows that there is a great improvement in terms of biases for β and α
when IV estimator or EW estimator is applied to deal with measurement error in the
classical case. RMSEs for β and α are dwarfed by more than a factor of 5 with the
application of IV or EW estimator when the error is in the classical nature. Comparing
between IV estimator and EW estimator in the classical case, IV estimator performs
better as it delivers a lower economic magnitude and a smaller statistical significance
(demonstrated by lower absolute value of t statistics) in biases. This could be because
IV estimator is better than EW estimator in handling the fixed effects. Nonetheless,
both IV estimator and EW estimator produce significantly biased estimates for β
when there is correlation between error and latent variable (non-classical error). The
bias and RMSE of β for IV estimator or EW estimator has increased by a factor of 10
if the non-classical error is introduced. Again the underestimation for α is significant
when the perfectly-measured variable (analogous to cash flow) is negatively correlated
with the latent variable (analogous to true q).
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Table 4.6: Monte Carlo performance of OLS estimator and EW estimator: panel
data
The results in this table are produced based on 2000 Monte Carlo trials of 2000 individuals
and 50 periods. The result is generated for both classical error and non-classical error with the
correlation between χ and z running from -0.3 to 0.3. Non-classical error is defined by setting
Corrpeit, χitq  0.3 for t  1 . . . T . β is the coefficient on the true latent variable, which is
analogous to the investment-q sensitivity. α is the coefficient on the perfectly-measured variable,
which is analogous to the investment-cash flow sensitivity. OLS estimator denotes estimates from
regressing yit on xit and zit. IV estimator denotes estimates based on equation in first-differences
with xit2 as the instrument. GMMn estimator denotes the EW estimator based on the moments
up to order n. RMSE (root mean squared error) is the squared root of the average squared
deviation from the true value. The bias is the mean deviation from the true value and the
corresponding t statistic is reported below.
OLS Classical Error Non-classical Error
Corrpχ, zq 0.3 0 -0.3 0.3 0 -0.3
RMSE(β) 0.0018 0.0019 0.0024 0.0043 0.0043 0.0049
Bias(β) -0.0018 -0.0019 -0.0024 -0.0043 -0.0043 -0.0049
t stat. -24.7094 -28.2041 -33.5281 -63.8659 -67.9432 -72.8933
RMSE(α) 0.0105 0.0021 0.0065 0.0156 0.0021 0.0115
Bias(α) 0.0104 0.0019 -0.0064 0.0156 0.0019 -0.0115
t stat. 11.0901 2.1594 -6.8393 16.9663 2.1966 -12.5414
IV Classical Error Non-classical Error
Corrpχ, zq 0.3 0 -0.3 0.3 0 -0.3
RMSE(β) 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 0.0031 0.0030 0.0031
Bias(β) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0031 -0.0029 -0.0031
t stat. -0.0341 -0.0046 -0.0316 -10.6361 -10.2254 -10.5889
RMSE(α) 0.0012 0.0011 0.0012 0.0076 0.0011 0.0076
Bias(α) 0.0004 0.0000 -0.0004 0.0075 0.0000 -0.0075
t stat. 0.3403 0.0135 -0.3103 6.6997 0.0139 -6.6150
GMM5 Classical Error Non-classical Error
Corrpχ, zq 0.3 0 -0.3 0.3 0 -0.3
RMSE(β) 0.0003 0.0002 0.0004 0.0029 0.003 0.0033
Bias(β) 0.0002 -0.0001 -0.0004 -0.0029 -0.003 -0.0033
t stat. 1.3503 -0.7393 -2.7719 -20.2485 -17.8762 -26.6898
RMSE(α) 0.0022 0.0013 0.0012 0.0094 0.0012 0.0062
Bias(α) 0.0019 0.0010 0.0007 0.0094 0.0009 -0.0062
t stat. 1.937 1.1575 0.7546 9.857 1.0734 -6.8234
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4.7 Conclusions
In this chapter, we mainly discuss the importance of measurement error in Tobin’s
empirical average q in explaining the observed time-series and cross-sectional pattern
of cash flow sensitivity. We find, via the errors-in-variables theory, that the effect of
measurement error in q on cash flow sensitivity depends on the covariance between q
and cash flow. The low or negative covariance between q and cash flow accounts for
low cash flow sensitivity observed in the recent years and in the financially-constrained
subsamples of firms classified as having high WW-index, KZ-index, HP-index and
no bond-ratings. Thus, by exploring the variance structure between regressors, we
provide an alternative explanation for the observed pattern of cash flow sensitivity.
Furthermore, by examining the classical assumption, we show that a high-order
moment-based GMM estimator (EW estimator) can produce biased estimates if the
measurement error is non-classical. Hence, the bias in the estimated coefficients for
q variable would continue to affect the coefficient estimates for cash flow variable
through the their covariance. In other words, the negative covariance between q and
cash flow still leads to a downward bias on cash flow coefficients estimated with the
EW estimator.
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Appendix 4.A. Financial constraint indices
WW-index classification: We construct an index of the firm’s constraint status based
on the results shown in Whited & Wu (2006). WW index is computed as WW 
0.091CF {AT  0.062DIV POS   0.021TLTD{AT  0.044LNTA   0.102ISG 
0.035SG where CF {AT is the ratio of cash flow to total asset, TLTD is the ratio of
the long-term debt to total assets, LNTA is natural log of total assets, DIV POS is
an indicator that takes the value of one if the firm pays cash dividends, ISG is the
firm’s three-digit SIC-based industry sales growth, SG is firm’s sales growth. In each
year, firms in the top 30% of WW index are classified as financially constrained and
firms in the bottom 30% of WW index are classified as financially unconstrained.
KZ-index classification: Following Lamont, Polk & Saaá-Requejo (2001), we construct
KZ index with the firm’s financial information. KZ index is computed as KZ 
1.002CF {K   0.283MB   3.139LEV  39.368DIV  1.315CH{K where CF {K is
the ratio of cash flow to capital stock, MB is market-to-book of asset ratio, LEV
is total debt (debt in current liabilities plus long-term debt) scaled by stockholder’s
equity, DIV is the ratio of total dividends (common dividends plus preferred dividends)
to capital stock, CH{K is the ratio of cash holdings to capital stock. In each year,
we rank firms based on KZ index and assign those in the top 30% as financially
constrained and in the bottom 30% as financially unconstrained.
HP-index classification: Following Hadlock & Pierce (2010), we construct HP index as
0.737  Firmsize   0.043  Firmsize2  0.040Age where Firmsize is equal to the
natural log of GDP-deflated total asset (in 2010 dollars), Age is the number of years
firms are active with a nonmissing stock price in Compustat file. We assign firms in
the top 30% of HP index as financially constrained and in the bottom 30% of HP
index as financially unconstrained.
Bond-rating classification: Firms that have a credit rating from S&P and issue positive
debt are classified as financially unconstrained. Other firms are treated as constrained.
Dividend-ratio classification: Following Chen & Chen (2012), we use the information
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of dividend history to classify the firms. We sort the firms based on their ratio of
dividends (dividends plus repurchase) to capital stock and the firms that are in the
bottom 30% of the annual distribution of dividend ratio for consecutive 10 years are
treated as constrained firms.
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Appendix 4.B. High-order moment-based estimator
The construction of fourth-order moment-based estimator is based on EW (2000) and
we adopt the classical assumption in EW (2000) in this appendix. With (4.2.4) and
(4.2.5), we can write down the second-order moment equations:
Ep 9y2q  β2Ep 9χ2q   Epu2q (4.7.1)
Ep 9x 9yq  βEp 9χ2q (4.7.2)
Ep 9x2q  Ep 9χ2q   Epe2q (4.7.3)
and the third-order product moment equations:
Ep 9y2 9xiq  β2Ep 9χ3q (4.7.4)
Ep 9y 9x2i q  βEp 9χ3q (4.7.5)
We can also come up with the fourth-order product moment equations :
Ep 9y3 9xq  β3Ep 9χ4q   3βEp 9χ2qEpu2q (4.7.6)
Ep 9y2 9x2q  β2rEp 9χ4q   Ep 9χ2qEpe2qs   Epu2qrEp 9χ2q   Epe2qs (4.7.7)
Ep 9y 9x3q  βrEp 9χ4q   3Ep 9χ2qEpe2qs (4.7.8)
The resulting eight equation contains six unknowns pβ,Epu2q, Epe2q, Ep 9χ2q, Ep 9χ3q, Ep 9χ4qq,
and it is possible estimate this vector by numerically minimizing a quadratic form
that minimizes the asymptotic variance. The same procedure can be applied to the
fifth-order or higher-order moment estimators.
Chapter 5
Concluding Remarks
Motivated by the challenges in understanding the relationship between investment-cash
flow sensitivities and the firms’ financial constraints, Chapter 2 provides an foundation
for the role of frictions generated by the real side of economic activities rather than the
financial frictions in explaining the firms’ investment response to the internal financial
resources. While showing that the increasing capital adjustment frictions is responsible
for the declining pattern of investment-cash flow sensitivity, it also demonstrates that
the increasing costs of capital adjustment can be attributed to the improvement of
technology over time. For the sake of corporate policy, firm managers should devote
adequate attention to adapting to the adjustment technology (e.g., maintaining a
well-trained labor force and streamlining the process of disrupting the old technology)
in the current wave of technological changes.
While empirical research faces the task of disentangling the credit-supply effect from
the credit-demand effect during the 2007-09 financial crisis, Chapter 3 builds and
calibrates a structural model where one can isolate the supply effect by modeling the
demand (productivity) shock and credit supply (collateral) shock as two independent
random processes. We assess different types of firms’ long-run behavior in the context
of capital and labor dynamics in the wake of plummeting collateral value.
Chapter 4 examines the endogeneity issue in empirical corporate finance from the
perspective of measurement error in variables. It focuses on one channel, the covari-
ance between mismeasured variable (q) and perfectly-measured variable (cash flow),
that accounts for the observed pattern of cash flow sensitivity. While most of the
127
128
error-corrected estimators are proposed based on the classical assumption that the
measurement error is independent of q, the presented Monte Carlo experiment shows
that the estimators perform poorly in the case that error is not independent of q.
This creates a challenge for researchers who attempt to draw conclusions based on the
estimation that rely heavily on the use of q.
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